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INTRODUCTION
[The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) constitutes a] radical
departure . . . from common law regarding the traditional asset
protection afforded by discretionary dynasty trusts as well as
spendthrift trusts in general.1
Mr. Merric’s article contains numerous unsupported statements,
mischaracterizations and misinformation about the UTC and about
American trust law in general. Even worse, using scare tactics that
take advantage of the fact that most state legislators’ constituents
lack trust law expertise, its clear intention is to undermine legislative
support for the UTC.2

The Uniform Trust Code3 is the first comprehensive codification of
the law of trusts. Approved in 2000 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the UTC has since
been enacted (sometimes in modified form) in at least a dozen
jurisdictions. The UTC has not been without controversy. As
evidenced by the epigraphs above, Article Five of the UTC—
concerning creditors’ rights—has generated a veritable war of words,
with opponents claiming that enactment of the UTC will result in dire
consequences to the traditional creditor-protection benefits associated
with spendthrift and discretionary trusts. The purpose of this Article is
to examine Article Five and the controversy it has engendered.

1 Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be
Affected by the UTC?, 31 EST. PLAN. 478, 478 (2004).
2 Letter from David M. English et al., U.S. Trust Law Experts Respond to Attack on the
Uniform Trust Code (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/UTCResponse_Feb04.pdf
(referencing Mark Merric et al., The Uniform Trust Code, Is Arizona’s Nightmare About to
Become Yours? (on file with Cardozo Law Review, previously available at
http://www.internationalcounselor.com), [hereinafter Arizona’s Nightmare]).
3 Except as otherwise indicated, citations to the UTC and its comments reflect amendments
through 2005.

2006]

THE FUTURE OF CREDITORS’ RIGHTS

2553

Part I of the Article offers some background about the UTC and its
development. Part I also describes, in summary fashion, some of the
controversies that have surrounded the UTC—including the controversy
over Article Five—and explains how these controversies have, in some
cases, inhibited adoption of the UTC by the states.
Part II examines the operative rules of Article Five; the purpose of
Part II is to set up the discussions in Parts III and IV. Part III of the
article examines and responds to the critics’ principal assertions about
Article Five. Finally, Part IV offers a normative analysis of particular
elements of Article Five and makes some modest suggestions for
reform.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Development of the UTC and Its Adoption by the States4

The UTC is the product of over a decade of study and drafting by
NCCUSL. The process began in 1993 with the appointment of a study
committee chaired by Maurice Hartnett, a Delaware Supreme Court
justice and former justice of the Delaware Chancery Court, with
substantial experience in trust cases.5 The function of the study
committee was to decide whether the Uniform Law Commissioners
should undertake the drafting of a comprehensive uniform law on trusts.
The study committee recommended the formation of a drafting
committee, which was appointed in 1994, with Judge Hartnett serving
as its chair.6 David M. English, now the Fratcher Professor of Law at
the University of Missouri-Columbia, served as Reporter for the
drafting committee.7 The drafting committee was served by numerous
advisors, which included representatives from the American Bar
Association Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, the
American Bankers Association, and the American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel.8 In drafting the UTC, the committee considered the
comprehensive trust statutes that already existed in some states—most
notably California, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas9—and used the 1986
4 This section of the Article borrows liberally from John E. Donaldson & Robert T.
Danforth, The Virginia Uniform Trust Code, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 325, 327-33 (2005).
5 See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 145 (2002).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 David M. English, Representing Estate and Trust Beneficiaries and Fiduciaries (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Feb. 10-11, 2005), WL SK089 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 191, 193 (2005).
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California statute as its initial drafting model. The drafters also drew
heavily upon the common law as expressed in the American Law
Institute’s Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts, the emerging
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts, and the Restatement (Second)
of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers).10
After approximately seven years of work in preparing the draft, the
Uniform Law Commissioners approved the UTC on August 3, 2000.11
Following a review of the NCCUSL Style Committee, the final text of
the UTC was completed on October 9, 2000.12 The official comments
were completed on April 25, 2001.13 The UTC was approved by the
American Bar Association House of Delegates at its mid-year meeting
in February 2001.14 Technical amendments to the UTC were approved
by NCCUSL in 2001, 2003, and 2004.15 NCCUSL approved further
amendments to the UTC in 2005, several of which concern Article Five.
As of the fall of 2005, the UTC, with some state-to-state variations,
has been adopted in Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Maine,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
Studies of the UTC undertaken by bar associations and special
commissions are complete or nearing completion in a number of
additional states. Legislative consideration of state versions of the UTC
in late 2005 or early 2006 is expected in Alabama, Massachusetts, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. Bar association studies are underway in Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, and
Washington.
The UTC was also initially adopted in Arizona in 2003, but almost
immediately following enactment, a small group of lawyers began a
public campaign to have the UTC repealed. In December 2003, the
Arizona legislature voted to delay the effective date of the UTC for two
years, and the statute was eventually repealed in 2004. In Arizona, at
the heart of the controversy were the claims of a small but vocal group
of critics, whose claims are described briefly in the following section.

10
11
12
13
14
15

See English, supra note 5, at 147-48.
See English, supra note 9, at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Criticisms of the UTC

The UTC has been the subject of pointed criticism from a small
segment of the estate planning bar, most of whom apparently focus their
practices on so-called asset protection planning—that is, the structuring
of clients’ affairs to shelter assets from the claims of creditors. These
lawyers have voiced their criticisms through numerous articles in
professional journals,16 through e-mail listserves,17 on web sites devoted
to the topic,18 and through interviews with newspapers and magazines.19
The most vocal of these critics has been Mark Merric, a Colorado
lawyer specializing in asset protection planning, who has devoted the
better part of the last several years in a campaign to prevent state
legislatures from adopting the UTC. Mr. Merric has spoken and written
prolifically about the UTC,20 arguing in numerous ways that the UTC
significantly erodes the creditor-protection attributes of trusts enjoyed
under the common law. Most of Mr. Merric’s criticism has focused on
creditors’ rights issues, and it is with this topic that this Article is
principally concerned. Another frequent topic of criticism is the UTC
provisions requiring trustees to furnish certain information to
beneficiaries.
The latter topic of criticism led to an unusual sequence of events in
Arizona. In 2003, a bill enacting the UTC was passed unanimously by
the Arizona House and Senate and was signed into law by the Governor.
16 See generally Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on the Asset Protection
of Spendthrift Trusts, 31 EST. PLAN. 375 (2004) [hereinafter Effect of the UTC]; Mark Merric &
Steven J. Oshins, UTC May Reduce the Asset Protection of Non-Self-Settled Trusts, 31 EST.
PLAN. 411 (2004) [hereinafter Non-Self-Settled Trusts]; Merric & Oshins, supra note 1; Mark
Merric et al., Malpractice Issues and the Uniform Trust Code, 31 EST. PLAN. 586 (2004)
[hereinafter Malpractice Issues]; Mark Merric & Douglas W. Stein, A Threat to All SNTs, 143 TR.
& EST. 38 (2004); Mark Merric et al., The Uniform Trust Code: A Divorce Attorney’s Dream, J.
PRAC. EST. PLAN., Oct.-Nov. 2004, at 41 [hereinafter A Divorce Attorney’s Dream].
17 The principal vehicle for public criticism of the UTC has been the listserve sponsored by
WealthCounsel, LLC, as described at http://wealthcounsel.com/listservs.aspx.
18 See,
for example, the web site for Merric Law Firm, LLC, at
http://www.internationalcounselor.com, which includes numerous posting about the UTC.
19 See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, The Great Trust Rebellion, FORBES, Aug. 16, 2004, at 122;
Rachel Emma Silverman, Trust Laws Get a Makeover, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2004, at D1.
20 For a number of reasons—as will be more apparent from the discussion in Part III—Mr.
Merric’s criticisms of the UTC have been a source of considerable frustration for those who try to
refute them. First, his explanations are often murky, making it a challenge to formulate a
response. Second, his writings are hyperbolic—in his view, the effects of the UTC are not just
undesirable, they are disastrous; those who read his articles uncritically approach the UTC with
exaggerated concerns about its effects. Finally, an essential premise for his position—the status
of creditors under the common law—is, in my view, incorrectly understood or, at least,
incorrectly described. Thus, he views the UTC as shifting the law away from a position that
arguably it never held. Assuaging the concerns of those about “changes” in the law is made more
difficult by this faulty premise.
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The bill had an effective date of January 1, 2004.21 During the months
following its enactment, the UTC became the subject of much
controversy. Opponents of the UTC objected most vociferously to the
provisions in the statute requiring a trustee to furnish information to
beneficiaries.22
According to the opponents, these provisions
dramatically changed the common law rules governing information that
must be provided to beneficiaries and seriously undermined the ability
of settlors to keep information about their trusts private.23 Opponents
also objected on procedural grounds, claiming that the legislation had
been enacted without adequate opportunity for public input.24 The topic
was the subject of substantial debate in the news media,25 as well as on
talk radio.26 In December 2003, the legislature, in a special session,

21 See Gordon Waterfall, The Uniform Trust Code is Arizona-Bound, 40 ARIZ. ATT’Y. 18
(2003).
22 The significant reporting and disclosure duties imposed on trustees under the UTC are set
forth in section 813 and may be summarized as follows. First, a trustee must keep “qualified
beneficiaries” reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and material facts
necessary to the protection of their interests; moreover, unless unreasonable under the
circumstances, a trustee must respond promptly to requests from beneficiaries for information
regarding administration matters. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a) (2005); see also id. § 103(13)
(defining “qualified beneficiary” to exclude those with remote, contingent interests). Second,
upon request of a beneficiary (not limited to qualified beneficiaries) the trustee must promptly
furnish a copy of the trust instrument. Id. § 813 (b)(1). Third, a trustee must notify qualified
beneficiaries of any change in the method or rate of the trustee’s compensation. Id. § 813(b)(4).
Fourth, a trustee must, within 60 days of accepting a trusteeship, give notice to qualified
beneficiaries of its acceptance and certain contact information. Id. § 813(b)(2). Fifth, within 60
days of learning that an irrevocable trust has been created or that a formally revocable trust has
become irrevocable, the trustee must notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trust’s existence, the
identity of the settlor, the right to request a copy of the trust instrument, and (as discussed below)
the right to receive annual reports. Id. § 813(b)(3). Finally, and most importantly, a trustee must
furnish, at least annually, to distributees and permissible distributees (and to other qualified or
non-qualified beneficiaries requesting the same) reports of receipts and disbursements, assets and
liabilities, the amount of the trustee’s compensation, and, if feasible, statements of the market
value of assets on hand. Id. § 813(c).
Partly in response to the controversy in Arizona, the notice rules of section 813 were
designated as “optional” in amendments adopted by NCCUSL in 2004. See id. § 105 cmt.
(discussing 2004 amendments).
23 See generally Mike Fimea, Privacy Issues at Center of Revision Quest, ARIZ. BUS.
GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 2004, at 1.
24 Paul Davenport, Law Wasn’t Controversial When Passed, AP ALERT, Dec. 26, 2003.
25 See generally Russ Wiles, Veil of Privacy Will Be Removed Jan. 1, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov.
23, 2003, at 1; Russ Wiles, Law Raises Questions for Creators of Trusts and for Beneficiaries,
ARIZZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 23, 2003, at 4; Russ Wiles, New Trust Law Rattles Estate Planners,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 7, 2003, at 4; Russ Wiles, Trust Law Put on Hold Until 2006: State Bar
Wants Time to Examine Impacts, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Trust Law Put
on Hold].
26 See Davenport, supra note 24 (discussing the talk-radio program hosted by lawyer Keith
DeGreen).
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voted to delay the UTC’s effective date,27 and in April 2004 the Arizona
UTC was repealed altogether.28
In their efforts to prevent the enactment of the UTC in other
jurisdictions, Mark Merric and other opponents of the UTC have
frequently cited the Arizona experience, claiming essentially that
Arizona legislators successfully enacted the statute only because they
were unaware of the UTC’s serious deficiencies.29 According to Mr.
Merric and others, a significant reason that the statute was repealed in
Arizona is that the Arizona legislature, upon further study, recognized
the UTC as a “radical departure” from the common law concerning
creditors’ rights in trusts. As more fully discussed in Part III, in my
view this is not a fair or reasonable characterization of the statute.
II. OPERATIVE RULES OF ARTICLE FIVE
This Part of the Article describes the principal operative rules of
Article Five. Sections 501 through 504 and section 506 of the UTC
govern the rights of creditors of beneficiaries who are not the settlor of a
trust; it is these provisions with which this Article is principally
concerned. Section 505 governs the rights of creditors of the settlor;
although this Article is not primarily concerned with the rights of
creditors of the settlor, it nevertheless discusses section 505, because the
section is relevant to the rights of creditors of non-settlor beneficiaries
holding withdrawal powers, who are treated as settlors to a limited
extent. Moreover, as later discussed, unstated dissatisfaction with
section 505 may underlie the critics’ more overt complaints about other
aspects of Article Five.30
A.

Rights of Creditors of Non-settlor Beneficiaries
1.

Section 501

Section 501 of the UTC, which applies in the rare case31 in which a
trust does not contain a spendthrift provision,32 provides that “the court
27
28
29
30

See Trust Law Put on Hold, supra note 25.
Napolitano Signs Repeal of Estate Planning Rules, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 2004, at D3.
See, e.g., Arizona’s Nightmare, supra note 2.
See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the critics’ complaint that the
UTC is “regressive”).
31 Section 501 also applies in the even rarer case in which a spendthrift provision does not
apply to the interest of a particular beneficiary or to a particular interest (such as the income
interest) of a beneficiary. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 cmt. (2005) (first paragraph).
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may authorize a creditor . . . of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the
benefit of the beneficiary or other means.”33 As the official comment
makes clear, section 501 “does not necessarily mean that the creditor
can collect all distributions made to the beneficiary”;34 for example,
“[t]he interest may be too indefinite or contingent for the creditor to
reach.”35 Moreover, the statute also provides that “[t]he court may limit
the award to such relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.”36
The comment explains the purpose of this language as follows:
Because proceedings to satisfy a claim are equitable in nature, the
second sentence of this section ratifies the court’s discretion to limit
the award as appropriate under the circumstances. In exercising its
discretion to limit relief, the court may appropriately consider the
circumstances of a beneficiary and the beneficiary’s family.37

32

Section 501, as amended in 2005, provides:
To the extent a beneficiary’s interest is not subject to a spendthrift provision, the court
may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary or other means. The court may limit the award to such relief as is
appropriate under the circumstances.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2005). Before the 2005 amendment, the statute provided:
To the extent a beneficiary’s interest is not protected by a spendthrift provision, the
court may authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s
interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary or other means. The court may limit the award to such relief as is
appropriate under the circumstances.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2003) (amended 2005) (emphasis added). The 2005 amendment
changed the italicized phrase from “is not protected by” to “is not subject to”; the comment
accompanying the amendment explains the change as follows:
A 2005 amendment changes “protected by” to “subject to” in the first sentence of the
section. No substantive change is intended. The amendment was made to negate an
implication that this section allowed an exception creditor to reach a beneficiary’s
interest even though the trust contained a spendthrift provision. The list of exception
creditors and their remedies are contained in Section 503. Clarifying changes are also
made in the comments and unnecessary language on creditor remedies omitted.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 cmt. (2005) (discussing 2005 amendments). The comment to section
501, as amended in 2005, further states that “[t]his section applies only if the trust does not
contain a spendthrift provision or the spendthrift provision does not apply to a particular
beneficiary’s interest.” Id. Thus, section 501 is properly interpreted as applying only to such
trusts and not to claims by exception creditors against trusts that include spendthrift provisions;
the remedies available to an exception creditor are described in section 503. The purpose of the
2005 amendment to section 501 was to resolve ambiguity in the statute concerning this issue.
33 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501.
34 Id. § 501 cmt.
35 Id.
36 Id. § 501.
37 Id. § 501 cmt.
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Thus, for example, the statute apparently would permit a court to
deny distributions to a creditor if the support needs of the beneficiary or
the beneficiary’s dependents could not otherwise be met.38
2.

Section 502

Section 50239 establishes several fundamental rules. First, a
spendthrift provision in a trust is valid only if it restrains both voluntary
and involuntary transfers of a beneficiary’s interest.40 Thus, consistent
with traditional doctrine, a provision that purports to restrict either
voluntary or involuntary transfers alone will succeed in restricting
neither type of transfer. Second, a settlor can establish spendthrift
protection for a trust simply by stating that “the interest of a beneficiary
is held subject to a ‘spendthrift trust,’ or words of similar import.”41
Finally, and most importantly, if an interest in trust is subject to a valid
spendthrift provision, “[a] beneficiary may not transfer [the] interest”
and “a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest
or a distribution by the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary.”42
The statute also provides that the general rule may be subject to
exceptions established elsewhere in the statute;43 this presumably
constitutes a reference to section 503, which governs the rights of socalled exception creditors—those given access to trust interests
38 This statutory concept is based in large part on language from a comment to section 56 of
the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts:
[T]he court will give creditors relief that is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. If the beneficiary has only a right to the trust income or a right
periodically to receive ascertainable or discretionary (but see § 60) payments, the court
will normally direct the trustee to make the payments to the creditor until the claim,
with interest, is satisfied. The court, however, may order less than all of the payments
to be made to the creditor, leaving some distributions for the actual needs of the
beneficiary and his or her family.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. e (2003).
39 Section 502 provides:
(a) A spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary
transfer of a beneficiary’s interest.
(b) A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held subject to a
“spendthrift trust,” or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary
and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.
(c) A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of a valid
spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided in this [article], a creditor or
assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution by the trustee
before its receipt by the beneficiary.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2005).
40 Id. § 502(a).
41 Id. § 502(b).
42 Id. § 502(c).
43 See id. (indicating that the general rule limiting creditor and assignee access to spendthrift
trust interests applies “except as otherwise provided in this [article]”).
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notwithstanding spendthrift protection. The comment to section 502
limits the application of the general rule by stating that “[a] spendthrift
provision is ineffective against a beneficial interest retained by the
settlor.”44 This statement is consistent with section 505, as discussed in
Part II.B.

3.

Section 503

Section 503 creates several categories of exception creditors and
establishes the remedies available to them.
The three categories of exception creditors are set forth in
subsection (b) of section 503 as follows:
A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against:
(1) a beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse who has a
judgment or court order against the beneficiary for support or
maintenance;
(2) a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection
of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust; and
(3) a claim of this State or the United States to the extent a statute of
this State or federal law so provides.45

The first and third categories of exception creditors are consistent
with traditional doctrine, although several enacting jurisdictions have
opted to delineate these categories more narrowly.46 The second
category, although not entirely consistent with the common law,47 is
based on section 59(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and is also
consistent with the prior two Restatements. As explained in the
comment to section 503, its purpose is to “allow[] a beneficiary of
modest means to overcome an obstacle preventing the beneficiary’s
obtaining services essential to the protection or enforcement of the
beneficiary’s rights under the trust.”48 Thus, for example, the
beneficiary’s lawyer in trust litigation would be entitled to recover from
the trust if the lawyer obtains a judgment against the beneficiary for the
44
45
46

Id. § 502 cmt.
Id. § 503(b).
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.03.B. (2005) (omitting spouses and former spouses
from the list).
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 reporter’s notes to cmts. c & d (2003).
48 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2005).
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lawyer’s fee. Note that, unlike the Restatements,49 the statute does not
create an exception for suppliers of necessaries, or for tort victims.50
Notably, section 503 is of limited effect—under subsection (c), it
permits an exception creditor to “obtain from a court an order attaching
present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”51
As explained in the comment, “[d]istributions subject to attachment
[under this provision] include distributions required by the express
terms of the trust, such as mandatory payments of income, and
distributions the trustee has otherwise decided to make, such as through
the exercise of discretion.”52 The comment emphasizes this point by
further explaining that section 503 “does not authorize [an exception
creditor] to compel a distribution from the trust.”53 In other words,
section 503 simply makes a spendthrift provision ineffective as to
certain categories of claims and claimants; the claimant must still
overcome other obstacles to recovering from the trust, such as language
in the trust granting the trustee discretion in making distributions.
Moreover, even if a claimant succeeds in attaching a beneficiary’s
interest, section 503 provides, as in section 501, that “[t]he court may
limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.”
Essentially, in formulating an award for a particular claim, the court is
expressly permitted to consider the support needs and other financial
circumstances of the beneficiary and the beneficiary’s family.54

49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b) (providing that, notwithstanding a
spendthrift provision, a beneficiary’s interest can be reached in satisfaction of a claim for
“services or supplies provided for necessities”).
50 The official comment to section 503 explains these omissions as follows:
Unlike Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 59(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved
1999), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 157(b) (1959), this Code does not
create an exception to the spendthrift restriction for creditors who have furnished
necessary services or supplies to the beneficiary. Most of these cases involve claims by
governmental entities, which the drafters concluded are better handled by the
enactment of special legislation as authorized by subsection (b)(3). The drafters also
declined to create an exception for tort claimants. For a discussion of the exception for
tort claims, which has not generally been recognized, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Section 59 Reporter’s Notes to cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt.
51 Note that this remedy is more limited than that available under section 501, which also
permits a creditor to reach the beneficiary’s interest by “other means,” language intended to
authorize a court to order the sale of a beneficiary’s interest. See infra notes 219-221 and
accompanying text.
52 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt.
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing the identical language contained
in section 501).
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Section 504

Section 504, the portion of the statute that has generated the most
controversy, contains rules determining creditors’ rights with respect to
distributions subject to a trustee’s discretion. The general rule, stated in
subsection (b), provides that,
whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor of a
beneficiary may not compel a distribution that is subject to the
trustee’s discretion, even if:
(1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of
distribution; or
(2) the trustee has abused the discretion.

Section 504(b) deliberately eliminates the distinction between
discretionary trusts and so-called support trusts—the latter being trusts
in which distributions are subject to a standard, such as one pertaining
to the beneficiary’s support, health, or education.55 The comment to
section 504 makes clear that, “[b]y eliminating this distinction, the
rights of a creditor are the same whether the distribution standard is
discretionary, subject to a standard, or both.”56 Both the statute and the
comment also make clear that eliminating the distinction affects only
the rights of creditors—it does not affect the right of a beneficiary to
compel a distribution, which, under section 504(d), a beneficiary has the
right to do if the trustee has abused its discretion or failed to comply

55 Most trusts that establish standards for making distributions (as opposed to wholly
discretionary interests) also grant the trustee some discretion in executing the standard. A typical
provision might state that the trustee “may pay to or for the benefit of X such amounts of income
and principal as shall be necessary for X’s support, health, or education” or “shall pay to or for
the benefit of X such amounts of income and principal as the trustee deems necessary for X’s
support, health, or education.” Note that, regardless of whether the dispositive language is
phrased as mandatory (“shall pay”) or discretionary (“may pay”), in both cases the trustee must
make discretionary determinations—in the second example, although the dispositive provision is
phrased as mandatory, the trustee must exercise its discretion in determining what is “necessary.”
Only rarely will a dispositive provision subject to a standard fail to include language granting the
trustee discretion—for example, the trustee “shall pay to or for the benefit of X such amounts of
income and principal as shall be necessary for X’s support, health, or education.” Whether this
language grants the trustee discretion, and thus would be subject to section 504(b), is an open
question. In my view, the proper answer is “yes,” because the trust implicitly contemplates that
the trustee will exercise its discretion in determining the timing and amount of distributions
“necessary” under the circumstances. A support provision granting the trustee no discretion
whatsoever would presumably be treated as purely mandatory, in which case it would be subject
to the rules of section 506, as discussed in Part II.A.5. See also infra note 114 (discussing a 2005
amendment clarifying that support standards will be interpreted as granting the trustee discretion).
56 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt.
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with a standard for distribution.57 Section 504(d) is discussed further
below.
The general rule of section 504(b) is subject to an important
exception. Under section 504(c),
[t]o the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of
distribution or has abused a discretion:
(1) a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judgment
or court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance of
the beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse; and
(2) the court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or
former spouse such amount as is equitable under the circumstances
but not more than the amount the trustee would have been required
to distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary had the trustee
complied with the standard or not abused the discretion.

Note that the exception applies only to claims of children, spouses,
and former spouses;58 other categories of creditors are not afforded the
benefits of this provision. Note also that the exception applies only to
claims for support; thus, it presumably would not apply to a claim in
connection with an equitable distribution order, nor would it apply to
other types of claims of a child, spouse, or former spouse (such as a
claim for money damages or restitution). Finally, note carefully two
limitations on the amounts that may be paid in satisfaction of any claim.
First, the amount paid cannot exceed the amount that the trustee would
have been required to distribute, assuming that the trustee complied
with the applicable standard and did not abuse his or her discretion. In
other words, the claimant’s access to the trust assets cannot exceed that
of the beneficiary. Moreover, the claimant can reach only amounts that
the trustee would have been required to distribute, not amounts that the
trustee would have been permitted to distribute. Second, the amount
paid must be “equitable under the circumstances”; thus, a successful

57 Section 504(d) provides that “[t]his section does not limit the right of a beneficiary to
maintain a judicial proceeding against a trustee for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply
with a standard for distribution.” Id. § 504(d). The comment states that
[e]liminating this distinction [between discretionary and support trusts] affects only the
rights of creditors. The affect [sic] of this change is limited to the rights of creditors. It
does not affect the rights of a beneficiary to compel a distribution. Whether the trustee
has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on factors such as the
breadth of the discretion granted and whether the terms of the trust include a support or
other standard. See Section 814 comment.
Id. § 504 cmt. The comment further states that, “[u]nder subsection (d), the power to force a
distribution due to an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard belongs solely to
the beneficiary.” Id.
58 A number of adopting jurisdictions have modified section 503(b) to allow claims by
children only. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.03.B (2005).
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claimant is not automatically entitled to the maximum amount that
would have been distributed to the beneficiary.59
Section 504(d) makes clear that section 504 “does not limit the
right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial proceeding against a trustee
for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard for
distribution.”60 Thus, the rights of beneficiaries with respect to
discretionary distributions exceeds the rights of creditors, except for the
categories of creditors and claims described in subsection (c). As
discussed in Part III.D, section 504(b) has generated some concern
among the UTC critics, in particularly that section 504(d), in
combination with section 814(a)—the latter of which requires a trustee
to exercise discretionary powers “in good faith and in accordance with
the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries”61—expands the powers of beneficiaries to compel
distributions beyond the powers held at common law. As later
discussed in Part III.D, in my view this concern is misplaced.
Section 504(e)62 was added to the UTC in 2004 to limit the
circumstances in which the assets of a trust can be reached by the
creditors of a beneficiary by virtue of the beneficiary’s status as trustee.
Under this provision, as long as a trustee’s power to make distributions
for his or her own benefit is limited to an “ascertainable standard,” “a
creditor may not reach or compel distribution of the beneficial interest
except to the extent the interest would be subject to the creditor’s claim
were the beneficiary not acting as trustee or cotrustee.”63 The 2004
amendment also added section 103(2), which assigns the same meaning
to “ascertainable standard” as in the Internal Revenue Code.64 As
59 But see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (noting that, in fixing the amount that would be
equitable under the circumstances, “the court having jurisdiction over the trust should consider
that in setting the respective support award, the family court has already considered the respective
needs and assets of the family”).
60 Id. § 504(d).
61 The full text of section 814(a) is as follows:
Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the terms of the trust,
including the use of such terms as “absolute”, “sole”, or “uncontrolled”, the trustee
shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.
Id. § 814(a). “Interests of the beneficiaries” is a defined term: under section 103(8), it means “the
beneficial interests provided in the terms of the trust.” Id. § 103(8).
62 Section 504(e) provides:
If the trustee’s or cotrustee’s discretion to make distributions for the trustee’s or
cotrustee’s own benefit is limited by an ascertainable standard, a creditor may not
reach or compel distribution of the beneficial interest except to the extent the interest
would be subject to the creditor’s claim were the beneficiary not acting as trustee or
cotrustee.
Id. § 504(e).
63 Id.
64 Section 103(2) provides:
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explained in the official comment, section 504(e) was added because
beneficiaries routinely serve as trustees, and a rule allowing creditors to
reach trust assets under those circumstances would “unduly disrupt
standard estate planning.”65
5.

Section 506

Section 506 provides that, “[w]hether or not a trust contains a
spendthrift provision, a creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may reach a
mandatory distribution of income or principal . . . if the trustee has not
made the distribution . . . within a reasonable time after the designated
distribution date.”66 As explained in the comment, the principle
underlying this rule is that, upon the expiration of a reasonable period
after the designated distribution date, “payments mandated by the
express terms of the trust are in effect being held by the trustee as agent
for the beneficiary and should be treated as part of the beneficiary’s
personal assets.”67 A significant 2005 amendment added a new
subsection (a), which furnishes a helpful definition:
“Ascertainable standard” means a standard relating to an individual’s health, education,
support, or maintenance within the meaning of Section 2041(b)(1)(A) or 2514(c)(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on [the effective date of this [Code]
[amendment] [, or as later amended].
Id. § 103(2) (alterations in original). Sections 2041(b)(1)(A) and 2514(c)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code are both provisions excluding from the definition of a taxable general power of
appointment “[a] power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of [the power
holder] which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support, or
maintenance of the [power holder].” I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(A), 2514(c)(1) (2000).
65 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (discussing 2004 amendments). The comment elaborates
on this point as follows:
The UTC, as previously drafted, did not specifically address the issue of whether a
creditor of a beneficiary may reach the beneficial interest of a beneficiary who is also a
trustee. However, Restatement (Third) of Trusts §60, comment g, which was approved
by the American law Institute in 1999, provides that the beneficial interest of a
beneficiary/trustee may be reached by the beneficiary/trustee’s creditors. Because the
UTC is supplemented by the common law (see UTC Section 106), this Restatement
rule might also apply in states enacting the UTC. The drafting committee has
concluded that adoption of the Restatement rule would unduly disrupt standard estate
planning and should be limited. Consequently, Section 504 is amended to provide that
the provisions of this section, which generally prohibit a creditor of a beneficiary from
reaching a beneficiary’s discretionary interest, apply even if the beneficiary is also a
trustee or cotrustee. The beneficiary-trustee is protected from creditor claims to the
extent the beneficiary-trustee’s discretion is protected by an ascertainable standard as
defined in the relevant Internal Revenue Code sections. The result is that the
beneficiary’s trustee’s interest is protected to the extent it is also exempt from federal
estate tax. The amendment thereby achieves its main purpose, which is to protect the
trustee-beneficiary of a bypass trust from creditor claims.
Id.
66 Id. § 506(b).
67 Id. § 506 cmt.
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In this section, “mandatory distribution” means a distribution of
income or principal which the trustee is required to make to a
beneficiary under the terms of the trust, including a distribution upon
termination of the trust. The term does not include a distribution
subject to the exercise of the trustee’s discretion even if (1) the
discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution, or
(2) the terms of the trust authorizing a distribution couple language
of discretion with language of direction.68

The primary purpose of this amendment was to remove any doubt
that a distribution pursuant to a standard should not be considered a
mandatory distribution for purposes of section 506. As explained in the
comment, the rights of creditors with respect to distributions pursuant to
a standard are addressed under section 504 only, and not under section
506.69
B.

Rights of Creditors of Settlors

Section 505 of the UTC governs the rights of creditors with respect
to a trust created for the benefit of the settlor. In most respects it
follows traditional doctrine, with some minor innovations. The section
principally addresses three topics: (i) in subsection (a)(1), the rights of
creditors of the settlor of a revocable trust during the settlor’s lifetime;
(ii) in subsection (a)(2), the rights of creditors of the settlor of an
irrevocable trust; and (iii) in subsection (a)(3), the rights of creditors of
the settlor of a revocable trust following the settlor’s death. Section
505, in subsection (b), also describes the circumstances in which a
beneficiary holding a withdrawal power will be treated as a settlor for
purpose of these rules.
68
69

Id. § 506(a).
Id.506 cmt. As further explained in the comment:
The [2005] amendment:
...
•correlates the definition of “mandatory distribution” in this section to the broad
definition of discretionary trust used in Section 504. Under both Sections 504 and 506,
a trust is discretionary even if the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard,
such as a provision directing a trustee to pay for a beneficiary’s support;
•addresses the situation where the terms of the trust couple language of discretion with
language of direction. An example of such a provision is “my trustees shall, in their
absolute discretion, distribute such amounts as are necessary for the beneficiary’s
support.” Despite the presence of the imperative “shall,” the provision is discretionary,
not mandatory. For a more elaborate example of such a discretionary “shall”
provision, see Marsman [v]. Nasca, 573 N.E. 2d 1025 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991).
•is clarifying. No change of substance is intended by this amendment. This
amendment merely clarifies that a mandatory distribution is to be understood in its
traditional sense such as a provision requiring that the beneficiary receive an income or
receive principal upon termination of the trust.
Id. § 506 cmt.
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Section 505(a)(1) provides that, whether or not a trust contains a
spendthrift provision, “[d]uring the lifetime of the settlor, the property
of a revocable trust is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors.” This
rule is not terribly controversial—it treats the assets of a revocable trust
as if they were owned by the settlor himself, thus bringing the treatment
of revocable trusts for creditors’ rights purposes in line with the
treatment of such trusts for federal tax purposes.70 The rule is
inconsistent with the common law,71 but few if any courts would likely
endorse the common law position today.
Section 505(a)(2) follows traditional doctrine in providing:
With respect to an irrevocable trust, a creditor or assignee of the
settlor may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or
for the settlor’s benefit. If a trust has more than one settlor, the
amount the creditor or assignee of a particular settlor may reach may
not exceed the settlor’s interest in the portion of the trust attributable
to that settlor’s contribution.72

70 Under sections 2036 and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code, the assets of a revocable trust
may be included in the settlor’s estate for estate tax purposes, I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (2000); under
section 676 of the Code, the settlor is treated as the owner of the trust assets for income tax
purposes, I.R.C. § 676.
71 The common law, as expressed in the Restatement (Second), draws a subtle distinction
between the rights of creditors arising as a consequence of a settlor’s power of revocation and the
rights of creditors arising as a consequence of a settlor’s interests as a beneficiary. As to the
former, the Restatement (Second) takes the position that “a power of revocation reserved by the
settlor cannot be reached by his creditors. If he revokes the trust and recovers the trust property,
the creditors can reach the property; but they cannot compel him to revoke the trust for their
benefit.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 cmt. o (1959). As to the latter, the
Restatement (Second) provides that the settlor’s creditors “can reach the maximum amount which
the trustee . . . could pay to him or apply for his benefit.” Id. § 156(2). Because most revocable
trusts also authorize unlimited distributions to the settlor, the distinction would have no practical
import in most cases—the distinction would be principally relevant in the unusual case of a
revocable trust in which the settlor did not retain a beneficial interest.
72 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2). Section 505(a)(2) may differ from traditional doctrine in
one significant respect, although the difference may also be simply the product of a drafting
oversight. Section 505(a)(2) provides that a creditor of the settlor may reach the maximum
amount that could be distributed for the settlor’s benefit, but the section does not expressly
provide that a spendthrift provision is ineffective with respect to an interest retained by the settlor.
See id. In contrast, section 156 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which is often cited as the
definitive statement of the traditional rule, provides both that a creditor of the settlor may reach
the maximum amount that could be distributed for the settlor’s benefit, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2), and that a spendthrift provision for a settlor is ineffective. See id.
§ 156(1). The practical significance of this difference is that, under the UTC, although a settlor’s
creditor would have the ability to overcome discretionary limits on the settlor’s interest in the
trust, the creditor may not have the ability to force a judicial sale of a non-discretionary interest.
One explanation for this difference may be that it simply reflects a drafting oversight—the
comment to section 502 states that a spendthrift provision is ineffective with respect to a settlor’s
interest, and the comment describes that rule as a “necessary corollary to § 505(a)(2).” UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 502 cmt. Nevertheless, section 502 provides that spendthrift provisions are valid
“except as otherwise provided in this [article],” and nothing in Article 5—including section
505(a)(2)—establishes an exception for an interest retained by a settlor. Id. § 502(c) (alteration in
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As explained in the comment:
The drafters of the Uniform Trust Code concluded that traditional
doctrine reflects sound policy. Consequently, the drafters rejected
the approach taken in States like Alaska and Delaware, both of
which allow a settlor to retain a beneficial interest immune from
creditor claims. . . . Under the Code, whether the trust contains a
spendthrift provision or not, a creditor of the settlor may reach the
maximum amount that the trustee could have paid to the settlorbeneficiary. If the trustee has discretion to distribute the entire
income and principal to the settlor, the effect of this subsection is to
place the settlor’s creditors in the same position as if the trust had not
been created.73

As I have argued elsewhere, this rule in effect grants a settlor’s
creditors greater rights than those held by the settlor himself. In
exercising its discretion to distribute income or principal to the settlor, a
trustee has a fiduciary duty to consider the interests of all trust
beneficiaries (not just the interests of the settlor) and thus cannot simply
accede to the demands of the settlor for distributions; allowing a
creditor to reach the maximum amount that could be distributed to the
settlor ignores the limitations on the settlor’s access to the trust fund
imposed as a consequence of this fiduciary principle.74 Nevertheless,
the rule expressed in section 505(a)(2) has heretofore been widely
accepted by courts and thus is likely current law in all jurisdictions,
other than those—such as Alaska and Delaware—with legislation
expressly changing the rule.
Section 505(a)(3) provides that, following the settlor’s death, the
assets of a revocable trust are subject to the claims of the settlor’s
creditors, costs of administering the settlor’s estate, statutory allowances
in favor of the settlor’s spouse and children, and additional amounts that
might otherwise be payable from the settlor’s probate estate. Section
505(a)(3) applies only “to the extent the settlor’s probate estate is
inadequate to satisfy those claims.”75 This rule has been relatively noncontroversial.
The statute also addresses the circumstances under which a person
holding a withdrawal power will be treated as a settlor for purposes of
these rules. Subsection (b)(1) of section 505 provides that, “during the
period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of withdrawal
is treated in the same manner as the settlor of a revocable trust to the

original).
73 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) cmt.
74 See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HAST. L.J.
287, 348-53 (2002).
75 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(3).

2006]

THE FUTURE OF CREDITORS’ RIGHTS

2569

extent of the property subject to the power.”76 As explained in the
comment, this subsection “treats a power of withdrawal as the
equivalent of a power of revocation because the two powers are
functionally identical.”77 Subsection (b)(2) provides that,
upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power [of withdrawal], the
holder is treated as the settlor . . . only to the extent the value of the
property affected by the lapse, release, or waiver exceeds the greater
of the amount specified in [sections 2041(b)(2), 2514(e), or
2503(b)78 of the Internal Revenue Code].79

Thus, a beneficiary who holds a so-called Crummey withdrawal power80
would be treated under subsection (b)(1) as the owner of trust property
(in the amount of the withdrawal right) while the power was in effect.
Yet, under subsection (b)(2), the beneficiary would not be treated as
owner after the power lapsed, assuming that the amount that could be
withdrawn was limited to the amount specified in section 2514(e).81
76

The full text of subsection (b) provides:
For purposes of this section:
(1) during the period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of withdrawal
is treated in the same manner as the settlor of a revocable trust to the extent of the
property subject to the power; and
(2) upon the lapse, release, or waiver of the power, the holder is treated as the settlor
of the trust only to the extent the value of the property affected by the lapse, release, or
waiver exceeds the greater of the amount specified in Section 2041(b)(2) or 2514(e) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, in each case as in effect on [the effective date of this [Code]] [, or as later
amended].
Id. § 505(b)(1) (alteration in original).
77 Id. § 505 cmt.
78 Sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e) establish special estate and gift tax rules, under which a
lapse of a general power of appointment, which otherwise would trigger estate or gift tax
consequences, is insulated from those consequences as long as the property that could have been
appointed is less than or equal to the greater of (i) five thousand dollars or (ii) five percent of the
value of the assets out of which the power could have been exercised. See I.R.C.§§ 2041(b)(2),
2514(e) (2000). Withdrawal powers subject to the “five or five” limitation, as well as withdrawal
powers that lapse to the extent of that limitation, are routine aspects of estate planning for
individuals with transfer tax concerns. Section 2503(b) refers to the $10,000 (as indexed for
inflation) annual exclusion from the gift tax. See id. § 2503(b).
79 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2).
80 Named for the case, Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), that first
approved the use of this technique for obtaining gift tax annual exclusion treatment for transfers
to irrevocable trusts.
81 There is a slight mismatch between the language of section 505(b)(2) of the UTC and the
language of sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e) of the Internal Revenue Code. Under section
505(b)(2) the holder of a withdrawal power avoids settlor status whether the withdrawal power
lapses, is released, or is waived. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2). Under sections 2041(b)(2)
and 2514(e), on the other hand, the holder of a withdrawal power avoids the estate or gift tax
consequences of that power only if the power lapses; a release or a waiver of the withdrawal
power, unless it satisfied the special rules for qualified disclaimers under section 2518 of the
Internal Revenue Code, would be treated as an estate or gift taxable event. See I.R.C. §§
2041(b)(2), 2514(e).
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This rule facilitates the common practice of granting beneficiaries
Crummey withdrawal powers and withdrawal powers subject to the socalled “five or five” limitations82 of sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e),
without exposing the trust assets to the claims of the beneficiaries’
creditors.83
III. CRITICIZING THE CRITICS
As discussed briefly in Part I, Article Five of the UTC has been
subject of pointed criticism, with the critics claiming that the UTC
represents a significant erosion of the creditor protection attributes of
trusts at common law. In many respects the arguments of the critics are
murky, making it difficult to formulate coherent responses.
Nevertheless, Part III of the Article attempts to identify and analyze the
critics’ principal arguments.
A.

Argument 1: The UTC Weakens the Creditor Protection
Attributes of Spendthrift Trusts

The critics argue generally that the UTC weakens the creditor
protection attributes of spendthrift trusts.84 For the most part, this
generalized argument is unsubstantiated, and for good reason—for it
appears to have little basis in law or fact.
The spendthrift protection afforded by section 502 of the UTC is
consistent with the attributes of spendthrift trusts at common law. If a
beneficiary’s interest is subject to a valid spendthrift provision, a
creditor of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution by
the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary. Note that the protection
afforded by this rule operates both to prevent a court from forcing a sale
of an interest for the benefit of a creditor and to prevent a court from
ordering that future distributions be made to a creditor.85 A spendthrift
82
83
84
85

See supra note 78.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt.
Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 478.
This point has been the source of apparent confusion. In one of their articles, Mark Merric
and Steven J. Oshins express their concern that section 501 of the UTC will be interpreted in such
a manner that, although a creditor could not recover directly from a spendthrift trust, a creditor
could nevertheless “attach the interest in the trust and merely wait [until the trustee decides to
make a distribution] for satisfaction of his or her claim.” Id. at 485. The authors apparently
believe that the UTC would allow a creditor to attach the beneficiary’s interest, after which any
distributions that the trustee decided to make would be required to be made to the creditor. This
perspective is based on a misunderstanding of section 501, which applies only to trusts or
beneficial interests that are not protected by spendthrift provisions. As long as (i) the trust
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provision is valid under the UTC only if it restrains both voluntary and
involuntary transfers of the beneficiary’s interest, but this limitation is
consistent with the law in virtually every jurisdiction in the United
States. The UTC makes it easy for a drafter to create a valid spendthrift
trust—under section 502(b), simply stating that a beneficiary’s interest
is subject to a “spendthrift trust” is sufficient to incorporate all the
protections of section 502.
The UTC, under section 503, creates a modest list of so-called
exception creditors—specific categories of creditors, with specific types
of claims, against whom a spendthrift provision is ineffective. The
exceptions for children, spouses, and former spouses for their claims of
support are consistent with the majority rule in the United States.86
Moreover, the UTC fails to include as exception creditors, and thus
strengthens the protections of a spendthrift provision, various other
categories of creditors that have been recognized from time to time by
the courts, such as suppliers of necessaries or tort claimants.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier,87 having the status of an exception
creditor does not, by itself, grant the creditor any right to trust
distributions. Only those distributions that would otherwise have been
made by the trustee (such as a mandatory distribution of income or
principal, or a discretionary distribution of income or principal that the
trustee has otherwise decided to make) may be the subject of a court
order directing them to be paid to the exception creditor. Thus, for
example, if the trust is a discretionary trust, and the trustee determines
in its discretion not to make a distribution, in most cases a creditor
would be unable to force a distribution in satisfaction of its claim.88
Note also that even with respect to distributions that the trustee either is
required to make or has decided in its discretion to make, under section
503(c) a court may limit the amount payable to the creditor, after taking
into consideration the circumstances of the beneficiary and the
beneficiary’s family.89
includes a valid spendthrift provision and (ii) the creditor is not excepted from spendthrift
protection under section 503(b), a creditor has no right to trust distributions until actually
received by the beneficiary. A narrow exception to this rule would apply in the situation in which
a trustee is delinquent in making a mandatory distribution, in which case the creditor may be able
to recover from the trust directly. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 506.
86 Of course, states are always free to limit the list of exception creditors, as several have
already done. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.03.B (2005) (omitting spouses and former
spouses); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-503(b) (2005) (same).
87 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
88 There is a narrow exception to this assertion, with respect to claims by children, spouses,
and former spouses in cases in which the trustee has failed to comply with a standard for
distributions or has abused its discretion with respect to making distributions. See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 504(c).
89 See id. § 503 cmt. (discussing subsection (c) and referring to similar authority granted
under section 501).
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Argument 2: Exception Creditors Are Granted Rights that Are Too
Broad, and the List of Exception Creditors Can
Readily Be Expanded

The critics have argued (i) that the remedies available to so-called
exception creditors are too broad and (ii) that the list of exception
creditors can be expanded too easily. This section of the Article will
consider each of these arguments in turn.
First, the critics apparently believe that one’s status as an exception
creditor means that one will automatically be entitled to recover from
the assets of a trust, even if the beneficiary’s only interest is
discretionary.90 In fact, however, an exception creditor’s remedies are
quite limited. Section 503(b) provides that an exception creditor “may
obtain from a court an order attaching present or future distributions to
or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”91 Thus, the exception creditor’s
remedy is to attach the beneficiary’s interest, not the assets of the trust.
Moreover, if the beneficiary’s interest is discretionary, except in the rare
case in which a child or spouse is able to establish an abuse of
discretion under section 504(c), if the trustee in its discretion withholds
distributions to the debtor beneficiary, then the creditor will be entitled
to nothing.
The critics also apparently believe that a governmental entity, as a
potential exception creditor under section 503,92 will be able to recover
as a creditor against a so-called supplemental-needs trust (a trust
designed to avoid disqualifying the beneficiary for needs-based
government benefits). The critics observe that, under section 503,
governmental agencies are no longer automatically considered an
exception creditor for purposes of spendthrift protection.93 Thus,
according to the critics:
90 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484 (“While exception creditors had no claim
against a discretionary trust under common law, all exception creditors would be allowed to
directly attach the assets of a discretionary trust under the UTC . . . .”). This is not, strictly
speaking, an accurate description of UTC law. The remedy available to an exception creditor
under section 503 is to attach “present or future distribution[,]” not the assets of the trust. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 503(b). If the beneficiary’s interest is discretionary, the exception creditor would
be entitled to nothing, unless and until the creditor chose to make a distribution.
91 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(b).
92 Section 503(b)(3) provides that a spendthrift provision is unenforceable against “a claim of
this State or the United States to the extent a statute of this State or federal law so provides.” Id.
§ 503(b)(3). Thus, a governmental entity—unlike children, spouses, and former spouses, for
example—is not automatically an exception creditor under the UTC; the government becomes an
exception creditor only if another state statute or federal law so provides.
93 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484; see also supra note 92 (discussing section
503(b)(3)).
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Once the state governmental agencies realize that they no longer may
recover from this type of trust, it may be only a matter of time before
the state or federal government is able to convince the state
legislators to add them as an exception creditor. At this time [that is,
after the state legislators have acted], a state or federal governmental
agency would be able to recover from all trusts in a UTC state,
including third-party discretionary Medicaid or special needs
trusts.94

There are several problems with this statement. First, the
statement appears to be criticizing the UTC for failing to make a
governmental entity automatically an exception creditor, because this
will prompt governments to change the law so that they are
automatically considered exception creditors. It is difficult to see how
the UTC constitutes a weakening of spendthrift protection, if the UTC
removes the government’s previously existing right as a creditor.
Second, the statement fundamentally misunderstands the relationship
between state and federal law. No matter what the UTC says, and no
matter how the UTC may subsequently be modified by a state
legislature, the federal government is not dependent on state law if it
chooses to recover from spendthrift trusts. If the federal government
wishes to be treated as an exception creditor, a federal statute or a
decision favorable to the government by a federal court will suffice.
Third, as discussed in greater detail below,95 governmental entities that
pay out benefits for disabled individuals (i.e., the beneficiary of a
supplemental-needs trust) are almost never creditors of the beneficiary
during the beneficiary’s lifetime. With respect to certain types of
supplemental-needs trusts, and under very limited circumstances, the
government may seek reimbursement from the trust following the
beneficiary’s death, but the creditor protection attributes of the trust
during the beneficiary’s lifetime are irrelevant. Moreover, in most
respects the right of a governmental entity to recover from such a trust
is dictated by federal law, not state law; thus, in this respect the UTC is
irrelevant.
Additionally, the critics are concerned that the list of exception
creditors may readily be expanded by a state legislature.96 According to
the critics, “[u]nder the UTC, the state legislature may easily do this
statutorily by simply appending an unnoticed exception as part of any
other bill that passes through the legislature.”97 In other words, the
critics apparently believe that having the UTC on the books will make it
94
95
96

Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484.
See infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484 (citing, by way of contrast, Mississippi
legislation overturning a court decision creating an exception for certain tort creditors).
97 Id.
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easier for future legislation on the topic to avoid public scrutiny. It is
difficult to understand, however, why a statute modifying section 503
would receive less attention than a statute modifying state common law.
Moreover, if recent experience is any guide, any changes to Article Five
of the UTC would be hotly debated.
The critics also apparently believe that the list of exception
creditors may be judicially expanded.98 Putting aside the question of
why the existence of a codified list of exception creditors (as opposed to
a list developed by the common law) would make judicial expansion
more likely, as opposed to less likely, the critics approach this question
with a faulty premise. Article Five of the UTC expressly prohibits
creditors from reaching the assets of a beneficiary’s interest in a
spendthrift trust, “except as otherwise provided in this [article].”99
Thus, the list of exception creditors in section 503(b) is exhaustive.100
The critics are also concerned that section 503 of the UTC provides
an opportunity for all creditors (not just exception creditors) to reach the
assets of a spendthrift trust through bankruptcy proceedings. As
explained by Merric and Oshins:
[W]hat if the federal Bankruptcy Code one day references the UTC
exception creditor list? . . . The federal Bankruptcy Code could take
advantage of this loophole [the “loophole” being that section 503(c)
contemplates the federal or state government granting itself status as
an exception creditor] by enacting a statute such as, “[t]he Federal
Bankruptcy Trustee is an exception creditor pursuant to section
503(c) of any State that has adopted this provision of the Uniform
Trust Code.”
All a creditor need do is file an involuntary bankruptcy against the
debtor, . . . and the creditor would have easy access to the trust
assets. In essence, this would mean all judgment creditors—not just
alimony, child support, necessary expenses of the creditor, federal
claims, state claims and tort creditors—but anyone who had a debt
greater than $11,625 [citing the Bankruptcy Code]. Should federal
bankruptcy law ever allow recovery against a trust in a UTC state,
there is virtually no asset protection provided by a spendthrift
provision.101

There are several problems with this anticipated parade of
horribles. First, section 503(b) contemplates a state statute or a federal
98 See id. at 484 (“future exception creditors may now be added both judicially and
legislatively”).
99 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(c) (alteration in original).
100 In this respect, the UTC notably differs from the Restatement (Third), which provides that
its exceptions from spendthrift protection are “not exclusive” and that “evolving policy may
justify recognition of other exceptions.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. a(2)
(2003).
101 Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 484-85 (emphasis added).
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statute or court decision granting the government status as an exception
creditor. Because the bankruptcy trustee is a fiduciary representing the
interests of creditors (which may or may not include governmental
creditors), it is not at all obvious that it would qualify as a governmental
entity for purposes of section 503(b). Second, the presence or absence
of the UTC as state law has no bearing on Congress’s ability to include
spendthrift trusts as part of the bankruptcy estate—federal law will
always preempt state law on such questions, regardless of whether the
state law is embodied in the UTC or instead is set forth in a non-UTC
statute or state court decision. Moreover, it is absurd to think that
Congress would target only jurisdictions that had adopted the UTC for
such a rule. Finally, as discussed earlier, having the status of an
exception creditor does not guarantee that a creditor will recover from a
trust.
C.

Argument 3: Eliminating the Distinction Between Support Trusts
and Discretionary Trusts Compromises Protection
from Creditors’ Claims

The critics argue that “the UTC . . . abolish[es] the 125-year
common law distinction between a discretionary trust and a support
trust, so that discretionary trusts must now rely on spendthrift protection
for their asset protection value.”102 For a number of reasons, in my
view the critics’ concerns about this issue are largely unfounded.
Regarding the distinction (and supposed abolition of the
distinction) between support trusts and discretionary trusts, some
background may be helpful in understanding the critics’ concerns. In
certain respects the case law concerning the rights of beneficiaries and
their creditors has drawn distinctions, though not consistently, between
wholly discretionary trusts—trusts in which the beneficiary’s interest is
described in purely discretionary terms, e.g., that distributions may be
made (or withheld) in such amounts and for such purposes as the trustee
determines—and so-called support trusts—trusts in which distributions
to the beneficiary are made subject to a standard, such as one relating to
the beneficiary’s health, education, or support. The case law concerning
these two categories of trusts often makes the following distinctions.
With respect to a discretionary trust, the beneficiary is not entitled to
any specific quantity of distributions. Because the beneficiary cannot
compel the trustee to make distributions, a creditor of the beneficiary
similarly cannot; creditor protection in the case of a discretionary trust
102

Malpractice Issues, supra note 16, at 586.
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depends not on the validity of a spendthrift provision, but on the nature
of the beneficiary’s interest.103 With respect to a support trust, because
the trust is established for the express purpose of providing for the
beneficiary’s support needs, the traditional view is that the beneficiary’s
interest cannot be alienated and, consequently, most creditors cannot
reach the beneficiary’s interest, regardless of whether the trust includes
a spendthrift provision.104 On the other hand, there is some authority at
common law that a supplier of necessaries (either necessary services or
necessary goods)—for example, a physician who has treated the
beneficiary—may recover from a support trust,105 under the theory that,
because the beneficiary could enforce the distribution standard, a
creditor could also do so, if the payments to the creditor would be
consistent with the standard.106
In what respects has the UTC eliminated these distinctions, and to
what extent does this affect the creditor-protection attributes of trusts?
The focus of the critics’ concerns about this issue is on section 504 of
the UTC, which contains two relevant provisions, subsections (b) and
(c). Under section 504(b):
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), whether or not a trust
contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor of a beneficiary may not
compel a distribution that is subject to the trustee’s discretion, even
if:

103

Professor Scott elaborates on this point as follows:
Where by the terms of the trust a beneficiary is entitled only to so much of the income
or principal as the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to give him, he
cannot compel the trustee to pay to him or to apply for his use any part of the trust
property. In such a case, an assignee of the interest of the beneficiary cannot compel
the trustee to pay any part of the trust property, nor can creditors of the beneficiary
reach any part of the trust property. This is true even in jurisdictions where spendthrift
trusts are not permitted. If the beneficiary himself cannot compel the trustee to pay
over any part of the trust fund, his assignee and his creditors are in no better position.
It is the character of the beneficiary’s interest, rather than the settlor’s intention to
impose a restraint on its alienation [by use of a spendthrift provision], which prevents
its being reached.
2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 155
(4th ed. 1987).
104 The point is explained in the Restatement (Second) as follows:
In a trust for support it is the nature of the beneficiary’s interest rather than a provision
forbidding alienation which prevents the transfer of the beneficiary’s interest. The rule
stated in [section 154] is not dependent upon a prohibition of alienation by the settlor;
but the transferee or creditor cannot compel the trustee to pay anything to him, because
the beneficiary could not compel payment or compel application in any way except for
the restricted purpose set out in the terms of the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 cmt. b (1959).
105 Id. § 157(b) & cmt. c.
106 See, e.g., id. § 157 cmt. c, which elaborates as follows: “If such a claim were not enforced,
it would tend to prevent the beneficiary from obtaining necessary services, and refusal to enforce
such a claim is not necessary for the protection of the beneficiary’s interest under the trust.”
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(1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of
distribution; or
(2) the trustee has abused the discretion.107

According to the official comment, this language “eliminates the
distinction between discretionary and support trusts, unifying the rules
for all trusts fitting within either of the former categories.”108
There is little, if any, doubt that section 504(b) does not diminish
the creditor protection attributes of either discretionary or support trusts.
If anything, the statute strengthens creditor protections associated with
those trusts in several important respects. First, even a supplier of
necessaries cannot compel distributions from a support trust. Second,
the statute eliminates any argument that a support interest should be
treated as mandatory and thus subject to compelled distributions to
certain creditors, who would stand in the beneficiary’s shoes. Third, the
statute eliminates any argument that a creditor, under some
circumstances, might be able to reach a discretionary interest under the
theory that a beneficiary could have compelled distributions from a
trustee who had inappropriately withheld distributions.109 Under the
statute, even if the trustee has abused its discretion, a creditor has no
right to compel distributions to the creditor. This point is confirmed by
the comment as follows:
Eliminating this distinction affects only the rights of creditors. The
affect [sic] of this change is limited to the rights of creditors. It does
not affect the right of a beneficiary to compel a distribution.
Whether the trustee has a duty in a given situation to make a
distribution depends on factors such as the breadth of the discretion
granted and whether the terms of the trust include a support or other
standard.110

Thus, the distinction between support and discretionary trusts is
eliminated with respect to creditor claims only, not for purposes of
determining the rights of beneficiaries.
107
108
109

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(b) (2005).
Id. § 504 cmt.
In this respect, note the difference between the approach of section 504(b) and the
approach of the Restatement (Third), which states that
if the terms of a trust provide for a beneficiary to receive distributions in the trustee’s
discretion, a . . . creditor of the beneficiary is entitled to receive or attach any
distributions the trustee makes or is required to make in the exercise of that discretion.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003). The comment to the Restatement (Third)
indicates that this language is intended to allow a creditor, under certain circumstances, to stand
in the beneficiary’s shoes and to compel distributions that the beneficiary could compel. Id. § 60
cmt. e. By contrast, under section 504(b), a creditor can never compel a distribution. Moreover,
even the Restatement (Third) contemplates that a creditor’s power to compel distributions will
often be more limited than the beneficiary’s power to do so. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 60 cmt. e.
110 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c) cmt..
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Under subsection (c):
To the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of
distribution or has abused a discretion:
(1) a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judgment
or court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance of
the beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse; and
(2) the court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or
former spouse such amount as is equitable under the circumstances
but not more than the amount the trustee would have been required
to distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary had the trustee
complied with the standard or not abused the discretion.111

Again, the comment makes clear that the provision is intended to
eliminate any distinctions between discretionary trusts and support
trusts, but only with respect to claims of creditors.112
Section 504(c) appears to strengthen traditional creditor protection
in some respects, and arguably weaken it in others. The provision
strengthens creditor protection by expressly providing that a claimant
cannot reach the beneficiary’s interest unless “the trustee has not
complied with a standard of distribution or has abused a discretion.”113
Presumably the burden would be on the claimant to prove that the
trustee has so failed to satisfy his obligations. In most cases, proving
abuse of discretion would be inordinately difficult; the statute will thus
dissuade many such claimants from seeking to recover from trusts.
Moreover, a 2005 amendment to the statute makes clear that a trust that
includes a support standard will be interpreted as granting the trustee
discretion in carrying out its terms.114 Thus, proving non-compliance
with a standard will be comparably difficult in most cases.115
111
112
113
114

Id. § 504(c).
Id. § 504.
Id. § 504(c).
Section 506 of the UTC was modified in 2005 to furnish a definition of “mandatory
distribution,” which, under section 506(b), a creditor can reach if the distribution does not occur
within a reasonable time after the designated distribution date. Section 506(a) excludes from the
definition of “mandatory distribution” “a distribution subject to the exercise of the trustee’s
discretion even if (1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution, or (2)
the terms of the trust authorizing a distribution couple language of discretion with language of
direction.” Id. § 506(a). Thus, the statute contemplates that distributions pursuant to a support
standard will be treated as discretionary, not mandatory. This point is bolstered by language in
the comment to section 506 as follows: “Under both Sections 504 and 506, a trust is discretionary
even if the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard, such as a provision directing a trustee
to pay for a beneficiary’s support.” Id. § 506 cmt.
115 Most trusts establishing a standard for distributions expressly grant the trustee discretion in
satisfying that standard. Consider, for example, a trust providing that “the trustee may pay to or
for the benefit of Child X as much of the net income or principal of the trust as the trustee may
deem necessary for Child X’s support and health.” Note that distributions from the trust are
limited to those necessary for the beneficiary’s support or health, but the trust does not mandate
that distributions for those purposes must occur—rather, whether and in what amounts to make
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Section 504(c) arguably weakens creditor protection—at least in
some jurisdictions—by expressly providing that children, spouses, and
former spouses with support claims can compel distributions from
discretionary trusts under some circumstances. Although there is
substantial case law supporting the proposition that a child, spouse, or
former spouse may compel distributions from a trust for the support of
the beneficiary,116 there is only modest support for the proposition that
such a claimant can compel distributions from a wholly discretionary
trust.117 Thus, states adopting section 504(c) may be changing their law
in this respect.118 Of course, even if a claimant could theoretically
recover from a discretionary trust, he or she would still be required to
prove that the trustee has abused its discretion in withholding
distributions, an inordinately difficult task under most circumstances.

D.

Argument 4: The UTC Grants Enforceable Rights to
Beneficiaries Not Held at Common Law

The critics argue that the UTC gives beneficiaries of discretionary
trusts enforceable rights not held at common law and that those
enforceable rights undermine the asset-protection attributes traditionally
associated with discretionary trusts. The gist of the critics’ argument is
that the creditor protection attributes of discretionary trusts depend on a
creditor standing in the shoes of the beneficiary—if the beneficiary has
no enforceable rights to trust distributions, then a creditor of the
beneficiary similarly does not. In the critics’ view, the UTC grants
beneficiaries of discretionary trusts greater rights than they held at
common law because the UTC requires the trustee to exercise its
such distributions is left to the discretion of the trustee. Moreover, defining what amounts are
necessary for the beneficiary’s support and health are expressly made subject to the trustee’s
discretion. In such a case, a claimant under section 504(c) would have to overcome two
significant obstacles to force a distribution from the trust. First, the claimant would have to
demonstrate a failure to comply with the standard—an especially difficult task, considering that
the standard itself is within the trustee’s discretion. Second, to the extent that the trustee
withholds distributions, the claimant would have to demonstrate abuse of discretion, a daunting
task under any circumstances.
116 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 cmt. b (1959); see generally SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 103, at § 157.1 (collecting and discussing various cases).
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1); see also Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a
Trust and Starve a Child: The Effectiveness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for
Support and Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 707-14 (1994) (discussing various cases).
118 Whether this is appropriate as a matter of public policy is a question to which each
adopting state is free to reach its own conclusion. Thus, for example, several states have enacted
a modified version of section 504(c), so that the rule applies only to support claims by children
(and not by spouses or former spouses). See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN § 55-545.04.C (2005).
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discretion in “good faith.”119 Apparently, the critics believe that the
common law does not impose a good faith standard on trustees. For a
number reasons, in my view, the critics’ concerns about the effects of
the UTC “good faith” standard are similarly not well founded.
The first and most important problem with the critics’ concerns is
that, in virtually all circumstances under the UTC, whether a beneficiary
has the power to compel discretionary distributions is irrelevant in
determining the rights of the beneficiary’s creditors. Almost all trusts
include spendthrift provisions and, under the UTC—except in the case
of exception creditors, such as a child or spouse to whom the
beneficiary owes a support obligation—a creditor cannot reach the
assets of a spendthrift trust or a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift
trust prior to the beneficiary’s receipt of a distribution. Moreover,
section 504(b) of the UTC prohibits creditors (other than a select list of
creditors with specific types of claims) from compelling distributions,
regardless of whether the beneficiary would have the power to do so.
Thus, in most situations, whether the beneficiary could compel
discretionary distributions would have no bearing on a creditor’s ability
to satisfy its claim.
In support of their position the critics cite to section 504(d) of the
UTC, which states that section 504—which prohibits creditors in most
cases from compelling discretionary distributions—“does not limit the
right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial proceeding against a trustee
for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard for
distribution.”120 This language, the critics claim, grants beneficiaries a
right to compel distributions, a right not held at common law. But
section 504(d) does not grant beneficiaries any rights at all; rather,
subsection (d) expressly provides that section 504 does not limit the
right of a beneficiary to maintain an action against a trustee. Not
limiting the right is not the equivalent of granting a right. Moreover, the
comment to section 504 makes clear that any right a beneficiary may
have to compel distributions would be governed by section 814, not
section 504.121
The focus of the critics’ concerns is on section 814(a) of the UTC,
under which a trustee is required to exercise discretionary powers “in
119
120
121

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a).
Id. § 504 (d).
Id. § 504 cmt. The comment states that the elimination in section 504 of the distinction
between support trusts and discretionary trusts
does not affect the rights of a beneficiary to compel a distribution. Whether the trustee
has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on factors such as the
breadth of the discretion granted and whether the terms of the trust include a support or
other standard. See Section 814 comment.
Id.
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good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust
and the interests of the beneficiaries,”122 even if the trust instrument
grants the trustee so-called extended discretion (by expressing that
discretion with terms such as “absolute,” “sole,” or “uncontrolled”).
According to the critics, at common law a trustee who is granted
extended discretion has no obligation to act in good faith. In support of
their position, the critics cite to authority that prohibits trustees from
acting in bad faith,123 which, the critics claim, is fundamentally different
from the good faith standard imposed by section 814. The critics also
apparently claim that the “good faith” standard under section 814
requires a trustee to act “reasonably,” which at common law, the critics
claim, a trustee is not required to do.124 Finally, at least one
commentator has questioned whether the requirement in section 814(a)
that the trustee act “in accordance with the terms and purposes of the
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”125 may enhance a
beneficiary’s ability to challenge a trustee’s exercise of discretion.126
122
123

Id. § 814(a).
Merric and Oshins view the bad faith standard as exemplified by the standard described in
a recent Colorado Supreme Court opinion. See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 479 n.1. In In
re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991), the Colorado Supreme Court, in an en banc
decision, stated that, “[i]f the settlor manifested an intention that the discretion of the trustee
should be uncontrolled, the court will not interfere unless he acts dishonestly or from an
improper motive, or fails to use his judgment.” Id. at 1156 (emphasis added) (citing SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 128.3). Putting aside the question whether the standard stated in
Jones is different from the standard stated in section 814, in several respects the critics’ reliance
on Jones is problematic. See Alan Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts: Alive and
Well Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 567, 607-08 n.210 (2005).
In the first place, Jones did not purport to establish a single standard for reviewing a trustee’s
exercise of discretion. Id. (noting at least four different statements in Jones concerning the
appropriate standard of review). Second, Jones did not involve a challenge to a trustee’s exercise
of discretion; rather, the court was concerned with whether a beneficiary’s interest in a
discretionary trust constituted property for purposes of a divorce settlement. Id. Also, it is
noteworthy that, only one year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, an immediate
appellate court in Colorado, in a case involving a challenge to a trustee’s exercise of discretion,
approved the trial court’s finding that the trustee’s conduct constituted a “breach of his fiduciary
responsibilities to act with the utmost good faith and fairness toward the beneficiary,”
notwithstanding that the trust instrument granted the trustee “sole” and “absolute” discretion. In
re Estate of McCart, 847 P.2d 184, 186 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
124 See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 481 (comparing language in the UTC and the
Restatement (Third)).
125 UNIF. TRUST CODE §814(a).
126 See U.S. TRUST, PRACTICAL DRAFTING 7440 (2003). As stated in Practical Drafting:
Section 814(a) illustrates the uncertainty that codifying the trust law may create. What
do the words “and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the
interests of the beneficiaries” mean? Do they create a stricter limit on the discretion
that may be conferred upon a trustee than the common law test set forth in the above
quotation from Scott [see below]? It seems likely that courts will use them to do so in
particular cases, yet their application to particular facts remains as hard to predict as
that of the common law. Has anything been gained by codification?
Id. The reference to the “Scott” quotation is to the following:
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For several reasons, in my view section 814(a) does not grant
beneficiaries greater rights to challenge trustees’ decisions than those
granted at common law.
Implicit in the critics’ argument is the assertion that, by granting a
trustee extended discretion, the trustee’s exercise of that discretion
becomes essentially unreviewable. But this has never been true at
common law. An essential principle of the common law of trusts is that
a trustee’s exercise of discretion is always subject to judicial review, no
matter how broadly the trustee’s discretion may be described.127 Thus,
even if the trust instrument grants the trustee extended discretion, that
will not be interpreted so as to relieve the trustee from an obligation to
account for its discretionary judgments.128 Because a trustee is a
fiduciary, it would be inconsistent with the concept of a trust to insulate
a trustee’s exercise of discretion from all judicial review.129 Moreover,
as a fiduciary, a trustee owes a duty of impartiality to the
beneficiaries.130 Thus, a trustee could be subject to liability for favoring
The extent of the discretion may be enlarged by the use of qualifying adjectives or
phrases such as “absolute” or “uncontrolled.” Even the use of such terms, however,
does not give him unlimited discretion. A good deal depends upon whether there is
any standard by which the trustee’s conduct can be judged. Thus if he is directed to
pay as much of the income and principal as is necessary for the support of a
beneficiary, he can be compelled to pay at least the minimum amount which in the
opinion of a reasonable man would be necessary. If, on the other hand, he is to pay a
part of the principal to a beneficiary entitled to the income, if in his discretion he
should deem it wise, the trustee’s decision would normally be final, although as will be
seen the court will control his action where he acts in bad faith. The real question is
whether it appears that the trustee is acting in that state of mind in which it was
contemplated by the settlor that he should act.
Id. at 7439 (quoting 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 187).
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (1959); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 211-12 (rev. 2d ed. 1980). As stated in the Restatement
(Second):
The settlor cannot confer upon the trustee such an unlimited power that the court will
not entertain a suit by the beneficiary to prevent the trustee from acting dishonestly. It
is against public policy to permit the settlor to relieve the trustee of all accountability.
It is true that the powers conferred upon the transferee of property may be so extensive
as to indicate an intention not to create a trust but to give the beneficial interest in the
property to the transferee. If, however, a trust is created, it is required by public policy
that the trustee should be answerable to the courts, so far at least as the honesty of his
conduct is concerned.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (internal citations omitted).
128 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c; 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
103, § 187, at 15.
129 See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES §
9.5, at 340 (3d ed. 2004) (observing that a “trustee” who is not subject to account makes no sense,
because a trust connotes some control over the trustee); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50
cmt. c (stating that it is “a contradiction in terms . . . to permit the settlor to relieve a ‘trustee’ of
all accountability”).
130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. b; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (2000)
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one beneficiary (a remainder beneficiary, for example) over another (for
example, a beneficiary requesting a current discretionary distribution).
The critics place too much emphasis on the language in some cases
indicating that a trustee may not act in “bad faith.” Court decisions vary
considerably in their formulations of the standards of conduct for
trustees; the formulations differ from case to case not so much because
courts intend to express substantively different standards, but rather
because the facts of a specific controversy cause one court to emphasize
certain aspects of the standard over others. As an example of
expressing the same standard using different words, consider the
following passages from Professor Scott’s treatise, in which he
considers the standard applicable to a trustee whom the settlor has
purportedly relieved of the requirement of reasonableness:131
In such a case the exercise by the trustee of his discretion will not be
interfered with by the court, even though he acts beyond the bounds
of a reasonable judgment, if he acts in good faith and does not act
capriciously.132

A later passage in the same section of the treatise expresses the
standard as follows:
Even though there is no standard by which it can be judged whether
the trustee is acting reasonably or not, or though by the terms of the
trust he is not required to act reasonably, the court will interfere
where he acts dishonestly or in bad faith, or where he acts with an
improper motive.133

Professor Scott apparently views these formulations as
interchangeable; there is no suggestion in the treatise that they should be
viewed as substantively different.134
(stating that, “[i]f a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in
investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries’
respective interests”).
131 As to whether a reasonableness standard applies to trustees or may be dispensed with,
consider the discussion infra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
132 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 187.2, at 38 (emphasis added).
133 Id. § 187.2, at 39 (emphasis added).
134 See id. § 187.2; see also Newman, supra note 123, at 605 (discussing this point). The
comment to UTC § 814 further emphasizes this point:
The obligation of a trustee to act in good faith is a fundamental concept of fiduciary
law although there are different ways that it can be expressed. Sometimes different
formulations appear in the same source. Scott, in his treatise on trusts, states that the
court will not interfere with the trustee’s exercise of discretion if the trustee “acts in
good faith and does not act capriciously,” but Scott then states that the trustee will
interfere if the trustee “acts dishonestly or in good faith, or where he acts from an
improper motive.” 3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts
Section 187.2 (4th ed. 1988).
Sometimes different formulations are used in the same case:
[If] the “sole discretion” vested in and exercised by the trustees in this
case . . . were exercised fraudulently, in bad faith or in an abuse of discretion, it is
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The critics’ assertion that a standard requiring “good faith” is
different from—and, more specifically, is more onerous than—a
standard prohibiting “bad faith” has no basis in the law. A recent article
by Professor Newman considers this issue directly:
Is the requirement of subsection 814(a) that the trustee act in good
faith, regardless of the extent of discretion the settlor grants the
trustee, a change from the common law?
No. Cases from many jurisdictions explicitly acknowledge the
requirement that trustees exercise discretion in good faith even if the
trustee is granted extended discretion. Many other cases, however,
do not explicitly acknowledge the trustee’s duty to act in good faith,
but instead provide that the trustee’s exercise of its discretion will
not be disturbed absent one or more of factors such as bad faith,
dishonesty, an improper motive, or a failure to use the trustee’s
judgment. The fact that these cases do not explicitly state that
trustees must act in good faith, regardless of the breadth of their
discretion, however, does not mean that the courts that decided them
do not require good faith of the trustee.
Rather, requiring that the trustee not act in bad faith, or dishonestly,
or with an improper motive, or fail to act altogether is another way of
expressing the fundamental fiduciary requirement that the trustee
must act in good faith (or implicitly includes that requirement).
There is much evidence that is the case.135

Professor Newman examines numerous cases from around the
country as well as other authorities and concludes that there is no
support for the notion that the two standards are substantively
different.136 To view the two standards as substantively different is
nonsensical—if absence of “bad faith” means something other than
“good faith,” what would that be? Just to ask the question demonstrates
the absurdity of the critics’ position—a fiduciary (or any person, for that
matter) acts either in good faith or not.
More fundamentally, the critics’ contention that at common law a
trustee granted extended discretion is not required to act in “good faith”
is simply wrong. The critics can point to no authority to that effect, and
for good reason, there simply is none. Professor Newman is able to
identify only one court stating that a trustee need not act in good faith,
but the statement constitutes dictum and, upon closer analysis, it is
subject to . . . review. Whether good faith has been exercised, or whether fraud,
bad faith or an abuse of discretion has been committed is always subject to
consideration by the court upon appropriate allegations and proof.
In re Ferrall’s Estate, 258 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1953).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. (2005) (alterations in orginal).
135 Newman, supra note 123, at 605-06 (citations omitted).
136 See id. at 605-09.
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apparent that the court was confusing the good faith standard with the
requirement that the trustee act reasonably.137 There are no cases
holding that a settlor may relieve a trustee from the duty to act in good
faith, for obvious reasons—to do so would be patently in conflict with
all notions of the standards of behavior expected from fiduciaries.
The question whether the UTC’s “good faith” standard also
requires a trustee to act reasonably implicates the more general question
as to whether the common law of trusts imposes a reasonableness
requirement on trustees. Putting aside section 814(a) for the moment, is
there a requirement at common law that a trustee act reasonably? The
authorities on this question are not consistent. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, “[i]f there is a standard by which the reasonableness
of the trustee’s judgment can be tested, the court will control the trustee
in the exercise of a power where he acts beyond the bounds of a
reasonable judgment, unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the
trust.”138 The Restatement (Second) further states that, if the nature of
the power conferred on the trustee is “such that there is no standard
indicated by the terms of the trust by which the reasonableness of his
conduct in exercising or failing to exercise the power can be
judged. . . . [T]he court will interpose if the trustee acts dishonestly, or
from some improper motive.”139 The Restatement (Second) further
provides that the use of extended discretion language is “not [to be]
interpreted literally but [is] ordinarily construed as merely dispensing
with the standard of reasonableness.”140 The Restatement (Third), in
contrast, observes that cases are difficult to find in which extended
discretionary language has been construed to excuse unreasonable
conduct.141 As discussed further below, the better view is that the
137 See id. at 609. In Krug v. Krug, 838 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), a trustee was
given the “sole discretion” to remove and replace a cotrustee. According to the court,
notwithstanding the use of the phrase “sole discretion,” the trustee was required to exercise his
removal power in “good faith.” Id. at 201. The court stated in dictum that, had the trust
instrument had used language such as “absolute,” “unlimited,” or “uncontrolled” discretion, under
those circumstances the trustee would not be required to act in good faith. Id. As pointed out by
Professor Newman, however, the dictum “appears to be based on the court’s mistaken treatment
of the trustee’s obligation to act in good faith as the obligation to act reasonably.” Newman,
supra note 123, at 609.
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. i (1959).
139 Id. § 187 cmt. i. illus. 12.
140 Id. § 187 cmt. j. The comment further states that, “[i]n such a case the mere fact that the
trustee has acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient ground for
interposition by the court.” Id. Note that the Restatement demands reasonable conduct of a
trustee if the discretionary grant of authority does not include language such as “absolute” or
“unlimited.” See id. § 187 cmt. e (stating that, under these circumstance, a court will interfere
with a trustee’s exercise of power if the trustee “acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable
judgment”); see also 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 103, § 187, at 14-15 (same).
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (2003): see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 127, § 560, at 217-18 (“The authorities do not appear to support the Restatement [Second]
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trustee’s conduct must always be reasonable, regardless of the breadth
of discretion granted.142
As to whether the UTC incorporates the distinctions drawn by the
Restatement (Second), consider the following passage from the
comment to section 814, as amended in 2005:
Subsection (a) requires a trustee exercise a discretionary power in
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust
and the interests of the beneficiaries. Similar to Restatement
(Second) of Trusts Section 187 (1959), subsection (a) does not
impose an obligation that a trustee’s decision be within the bounds of
a reasonable judgment, although such an interpretive standard may
be imposed by the courts if the document adds a standard whereby
the reasonableness of the trustee’s judgment can be tested.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 cmt. f (1959).143

Notably, the comment refers to the distinction in the Restatement
(Second) between discretion subject to a standard and discretion in the
absence of a standard, as described above,144 but it does not refer to the
earlier described distinction between ordinary discretion and extended
discretion.145 By not addressing this question, the UTC may simply be
leaving the matter to the common law.146
Finally, does the requirement in section 814(a) that a trustee
exercise extended discretionary powers “in accordance with the terms
and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”147 subject
a trustee to a higher level of scrutiny than at common law? Numerous
cases and other authorities confirm that, notwithstanding broad grants of
discretion to a trustee, a trustee nevertheless must act in a manner
consistent with the terms and purposes of the trust.148 The expression
“interests of the beneficiaries” is defined in section 103(8) of the UTC:
position that there is no requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of a power granted in the
trustee’s absolute discretion.”).
142 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
143 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. (2005).
144 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. According to the Restatement (Second),
a reasonableness requirement is imposed only if there is a standard against which it can be
measured.
145 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. According to the Restatement (Second), the
use of extended discretion dispenses with the reasonableness requirement.
146 See Newman, supra note 123, at 610-11. Professor Newman cites to UTC § 106, which
provides that “[t]he common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this [Code], except
to the extent modified by this [Code] or another statute of this State.” UNIF. TRUST Code
§106(a) (first alteration added). Thus, to the extent section 814 is silent concerning this question,
a court would be bound by precedent or free to devise its own rule.
147 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a).
148 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. j (1959) (stating that a trustee granted
extended discretion may not exercise its discretion “from some motive other than the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust”); see also Newman, supra note 123, at 614 & n.239
(citing cases).
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it simply means “the beneficial interests provided in the terms of the
trust.”149 As stated in the comment to section 103, the “definition
clarifies that the interests are as provided in the terms of the trust and
not as determined by the beneficiaries.”150 This explanation should be
sufficient to counter any suggestion that section 814(a) enhances the
power of any particular beneficiary to demand discretionary
distributions from a trustee.
E.

Argument 5: The UTC Compromises the Effectiveness of
Supplemental-Needs Trusts

The critics argue that the UTC will undermine the effectiveness of
so-called supplemental needs trusts—trusts intended to allow their
beneficiaries to qualify for needs-based governmental benefits. The
critics’ arguments concerning this issue may be summarized as follows:
With respect to Medicaid or special needs trusts, the
UTC . . . create[s] two major concerns.
First, will a federal
government or state government be able to attach the beneficial
interest? Second, will the Medicaid or special needs trust be
considered an available resource of the beneficiary?
For states that adopt the UTC, it may be only a short time before
third-party Medicaid or special needs trust planning is greatly
curtailed and eventually eliminated. If the discretionary trust and
support trust distinction no longer exists, the federal government or
state legislature can pierce any trust by enacting a statute saying that
the government may attach the beneficiary’s interest and reach some
or all of the trust assets.
In states that do not follow the UTC . . . , an interest in a
discretionary trust is not a property interest (i.e., an enforceable
right). Both Medicaid trust and special needs trust planning depend
on the dichotomy between discretionary and support trusts related to
this property issue. Regarding the second issue, if a beneficiary has
an enforceable right to a distribution, the federal or state government
need not necessarily attach a beneficiary’s interest. The federal or
state government may merely consider the trust as an ‘available
resource’ and deny benefits.151

Thus, the gist of the critics’ arguments is (i) that the federal or state
government, as a creditor, may be able to attach the assets of a
supplemental needs trust or the interest of the beneficiary, and (ii) that
149
150
151

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(8).
Id. § 103 cmt. (emphasis added).
Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 486 (footnotes omitted).
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the UTC grants beneficiaries enforceable rights that will cause the trust
assets to be treated as a resource of the beneficiary for purposes of
qualifying for benefits. In my view, for a number of reasons the critics’
assertions concerning these issues are fundamentally flawed.
Some background about supplemental needs trusts may be helpful
in understanding these issues. A supplemental needs trust is designed to
prevent the trust assets from being treated as a resource of the
beneficiary for purposes of determining eligibility for needs-based
governmental benefits. The term “supplemental needs” refers to the
fact that typically such trusts are structured to provide for needs of the
beneficiary that are supplemental to the needs of the beneficiary
provided for by the government. There are two general types of
supplemental needs trusts: (i) self-settled trusts, i.e., trusts for the
benefit of the settlor, which are designed to avoid disqualifying the
settlor for governmental benefits and (ii) third-party trusts, i.e., trusts for
the benefit of someone other than the settlor, designed to avoid
disqualifying the beneficiary for benefits. Self-settled supplemental
needs trusts are subject to federal law, enacted as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), under which a trust that
satisfies the OBRA requirements enables assets to be held for a disabled
settlor’s benefit without disqualifying the settlor for public benefits.152
A self-settled supplemental needs trust is effective for its intended
purpose only if it is drafted in accordance with the OBRA
requirements.153 The UTC will have no bearing on the effectiveness of
these trusts under federal law.154 Whether the UTC will compromise
the effectiveness of third-party supplemental needs trusts is a more
difficult question, but, again, in my view, the concerns of the critics are
unfounded.
As illustrated by the earlier quoted materials,155 the first issue
raised by the critics is that the federal or state government may attach
the assets of a supplemental needs trusts or the beneficiary’s interest in
such a trust. The critics’ concerns about this question reflect some
fundamental misunderstandings about the law governing public benefits
and supplemental needs trusts. The most commonly encountered public
assistance programs are Social Security Disability Income,
Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid. With respect
to Social Security Disability Income, Supplemental Security Income,
and Medicare, there are no circumstances under which a governmental
152 See generally CLIFTON B. KRUSE, JR., THIRD-PARTY AND SELF-CREATED TRUSTS:
PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED CLIENT 11-13 (3d ed. 2002).
153 See id.
154 See Newman, supra note 123, at 619.
155 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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entity would become a creditor of a trust beneficiary, unless benefits
were paid in error.156 With respect to Medicaid, federal law mandates
the recovery of certain benefits following the recipient’s death and,
except in the case of certain real property owned by a permanently
institutionalized individual,157 there is no right for the federal
government or a state government to attach the assets of the recipient
during the recipient’s lifetime.158 If the supplemental needs trust is selfsettled, then federal law mandates reimbursement of any benefits paid
during the beneficiary’s lifetime; under these circumstances, the UTC
would simply be irrelevant. If, instead, the trust is a third-party
supplemental needs trust, in most cases the trust assets would not fit the
definition of the “recovery estate,” as defined by state legislation
implementing the Medicaid benefits scheme.
As long as the
beneficiary’s right to receive distributions is subject to the trustee’s
discretion, the trust should not form part of the beneficiary’s recovery
estate and thus would not be available for reimbursement of any
benefits paid during the beneficiary’s lifetime.159
The second issue raised by the critics is that the UTC will cause a
beneficiary’s interest in a third-party supplemental needs trust to be
considered an available resource for purposes of qualifying for public
assistance. Although this is a more legitimate concern than the critics’
concern about the government as a creditor, in my view, once again, the
concern is unfounded.
Again, some background may be helpful in understanding the
issue. As a general rule, public assistance is limited to those with very
limited income and other assets. If the assets of a supplemental needs
trust were treated as an asset of the beneficiary, he or she would likely
not qualify for most public assistance. The most important of the needsbased public assistance programs is Medicaid, under which assets held
in trust will be treated as a resource of the beneficiary only if the
beneficiary has the ability to compel distributions for his or her
support.160 Thus, the effect that the UTC has on a beneficiary’s
eligibility for Medicaid depends on the extent to which the UTC
enhances a beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions.
Many supplemental needs trusts are drafted specifically to enable
the beneficiary to qualify for Medicaid or other public assistance and to
provide the beneficiary with amounts other than for the beneficiary’s
156 See Richard E. Davis & Stanley C. Kent, The Impact of the Uniform Trust Code on Special
Needs Trusts, 1 NAELA J. 235, 237 (2005).
157 Moreover, a residence owned by a supplemental needs trust would not be considered to be
owned by the beneficiary for purposes of these rules. See id. at 238-39.
158 See id. at 238.
159 See id. at 239.
160 See KRUSE, supra note 152, at 52-54.
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basic support. Such a trust would typically preclude the trustee from
making distributions for the beneficiary’s basic support needs and
authorize the trustee to make distributions for the beneficiary’s
supplemental needs—that is, to make distributions for non-essentials
such as travel, vacations, cultural activities, private (as opposed to
shared) institutional housing, elective medical care, etc. There is
substantial and consistent case law holding that the assets of such trusts
are not considered available resources for Medicaid qualification
purposes; moreover, the result is codified by statute in many
jurisdictions.161 The UTC will have no effect on the continued
effectiveness of such trusts for this purpose. Under section 814(a), the
trustee is required to carry out the terms of the trust in good faith; if the
trust terms prohibit distributions for the beneficiary’s basic support
needs, the UTC will require adherence to this prohibition.
Next, consider a trust expressly intended to be a supplemental
needs trust. To what extent will such a trust be considered an available
resource for Medicaid purposes, and what effect, if any, will the UTC
have on that result? In general, a trust under which the trustee is
required to make distribution for the beneficiary’s basic support needs
will be considered an available resource for Medicaid qualification
purposes.162 The UTC will have no bearing on the treatment of such
trusts. On the other hand, in general a wholly discretionary trust
without a support standard will not be considered an available resource
for Medicaid purposes.163 As discussed earlier, the UTC should not
enhance a beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions from such trusts;
thus the UTC should not adversely affect the effectiveness of wholly
discretionary trusts for purposes of Medicaid qualification.
A more difficult issue is the Medicaid treatment of third-party
trusts in which the trustee is granted discretion in making distributions
for the beneficiary’s support. Putting aside the effect that the UTC may
have on this question, the case law concerning such trusts is
inconsistent, with some cases holding that the trust assets are an
available resource for Medicaid qualification purposes, and others
holding that they are not.164 The cases turn on the court’s interpretation
of the settlor’s intent and thus the outcome of any particular case is
largely fact-driven. The UTC should have little, if any, effect on the
outcome of these cases, although for several reasons it may help
somewhat for those seeking to qualify for public assistance. First, as
161
162
163
164

See id. at 70-78 (discussing cases); 78-82 (discussing statutes).
See id. at 51-52.
See id. at 53.
See id. at 54-70 (discussing the issue generally); id. at 117-28 (tabular summary of
significant cases).
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earlier discussed, the UTC treats support trusts as discretionary,165
thereby limiting a beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions. Second,
under a 2005 amendment, the comment to section 814 cites with
approval language from the Restatement (Third) to the effect that, in
exercising its discretion, a trustee should do so in a manner that avoids
disqualifying the beneficiary for public benefits.166 In a borderline case,
the comment to section 814 may help produce a favorable interpretation
of the language of a discretionary trust that also includes a support
standard.
F.

Argument 6: The UTC Increases the Exposure of Trust Assets in
Divorce Proceedings

The UTC critics claim that the statute will have a multitude of
adverse consequences for beneficiaries who divorce.167 Among the
critics’ claims are: (i) that the UTC enhances the ability of a former
spouse to reach the assets of a trust for purposes of satisfying an
alimony claim; (ii) that the UTC will cause a beneficiary’s interest in a
trust to constitute a divisible asset for equitable distribution purposes;
and (iii) that the UTC will allow courts to consider a beneficiary’s
interest in a trust for purposes of making alimony or child support
awards.168 These claims reflect a misunderstanding of both domestic
relations law and the UTC.
With respect to the first claim, whether the UTC enhances the
ability of a former spouse to satisfy an alimony claim depends entirely
on whether a former spouse had that ability under the pre-UTC law of
an adopting state. In many jurisdictions, the common law already
establishes a former spouse with an alimony claims as an exception
creditor; thus, in these jurisdictions the UTC would effect no change in
165 This point is made clear in the 2005 amendments to the comments to section 506 of the
UTC. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
166 The full text of the comment is as follows:
[W]hether the trustee has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on
the exact language used, whether the standard grants discretion and its breadth,
whether this discretion is coupled with a standard, whether the beneficiary has other
available resurces [sic], and, more broadly, the overriding purposes of the trust. For
example, distilling the results of scores of cases, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
concludes that there is a presumption that the “trustee’s discretion should be exercised
in a manner that will avoid either disqualifying the beneficiary for other benefits or
expending trust funds for purposes for which public funds would otherwise be
available.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 50 cmt. e & Reporter’s Notes
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt. (2005).
167 A Divorce Attorney’s Dream, supra note 16.
168 See generally id. at 45-50.
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the law. In those jurisdictions in which a former spouse with an
alimony claim is not an exception creditor, the jurisdiction is free to
modify the UTC, as has occurred already in several enacting
jurisdictions. As observed earlier, the UTC may modestly enhance a
former spouse’s ability to compel discretionary distributions in some
jurisdictions, although the former spouse would need to prove that the
trustee had abused its discretion, a daunting task under most
circumstances. Moreover, an enacting jurisdiction is again free to
modify the UTC in this respect, as several jurisdictions have already
done.
With respect to the second claim, the UTC should have little or no
effect on whether a beneficiary’s interest in a trust constitutes a divisible
asset. In most cases, such a trust would be considered separate property
of the beneficiary and thus would not be subject to equitable
distribution. If the trust is in a jurisdiction in which separate property,
in general, is subject to equitable distribution, whether the specific trust
in question would be subject to division would depend on a multitude of
factors, none of which would be affected to any significant extent by the
UTC.169 The critics claim that a beneficiary’s discretionary interest in a
trust is more likely to be subject to equitable division under the UTC,
because, as the critics claim, the beneficiary will have an enhanced
ability to compel distributions. As discussed earlier, in my view there is
no support whatsoever for the view that the UTC enhances a
beneficiary’s ability to compel discretionary distributions.170 The critics
also claim that, even if a beneficiary’s interest in a trust is not itself
subject to equitable division, in a UTC jurisdiction a court will be more
likely to take the beneficiary’s interest into account, as the court
considers generally the beneficiary’s economic circumstances. This
claim, too, is founded on the notion that the UTC enhances a
beneficiary’s ability to compel distributions from discretionary trusts, a
notion earlier discredited.
Finally, the critics claim that, in evaluating a beneficiary’s
economic circumstances for purposes of making alimony and child
169

The factors are summarized by Professor Newman as follows:
(1) whether the beneficiary’s interest is in a trust created by another that is revocable
by its still living settlor; (2) whether the beneficiary’s interest is vested; (3) whether the
beneficiary’s interest may be defeated by another’s exercise of a power of
appointment; (4) whether the beneficiary’s interest may be eliminated by discretionary
distributions to another beneficiary, or by another beneficiary’s power to invade
principal; (5) whether the beneficiary’s interest is a remainder; (6) whether the
beneficiary’s interest is an income interest; or (7) whether the beneficiary’s interest is
subject to the discretion of the trustee and thus is treated as an expectancy, rather than
as divisible property.
Newman, supra note 123, at 627-29 (citations omitted).
170 See supra Section III.D.
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support awards, a court in a UTC jurisdiction will impute trust assets
and trust income to the beneficiary of a discretionary trust. This claim,
too, is based on the unsupported claim that the UTC enhances a
beneficiary’s ability to compel discretionary distributions.171 As
discussed elsewhere, there is no substantial support for the critics’
position concerning this question.
G.

Argument 7: Drafting a Trust in a UTC Jurisdiction
Constitutes Malpractice

The critics have also argued that drafting a trust in a UTC
jurisdiction may expose the lawyer to a malpractice claim for failing to
advise his or her client of the increased exposure to creditors’ claims
caused by the UTC. The critics analogize this situation to that of a
lawyer who fails to advise his or her client of the advantages of
establishing a trust in a jurisdiction with no state income tax on
accumulated trust income.172 According to the critics, a lawyer’s failure
to disclose to his or her client the “potential decrease in asset protection
available to beneficiaries” in UTC jurisdictions173 raises malpractice
171 In support of their position, the critics cite to a recent Massachusetts case, Dwight v.
Dwight, 756 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), although they fundamentally misstate both the
holding and the reasoning of the case. See Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 487. Dwight does
not, as the critics claim, see A Divorce Attorney’s Dream, supra note 16, at 50, stand for the
proposition that the income earned in a discretionary trust will be imputed to a beneficiary for
purposes of making an alimony award. Dwight involved a separation agreement, which
authorized the wife to bring a claim for alimony if the husband received a substantial inheritance.
The husband’s father died, leaving a portion of his estate in a discretionary support trust for the
husband and his descendants. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that
the trust constituted a substantial inheritance for purposes of the separation agreement. 756
N.E.2d at 20-21. The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the trust
increased the husband’s income, although this finding was based on highly specific factual
circumstances, including the fact that the husband had told the trustee that he did not want to
receive distributions that the trustee otherwise was inclined to make. Notably, the case did not
arise under the UTC. The critics acknowledge this to be true, but claim that “the opinion cited the
Restatement Third . . . as authority for dismissing the son’s claim” “that he had no enforceable
right to a distribution.” Merric & Oshins, supra note 1, at 487. (The critics view the approaches
of the UTC and the Restatement (Third) as equivalent with respect to a beneficiary’s right to
compel distributions from a discretionary trust. See id. at 478-79, 481.) In fact, however, the
Dwight court’s citation to the Restatement (Third) had nothing to do with the question whether
the husband could compel distributions to himself; rather, the Restatement (Third) was cited in a
footnote, concerning an issue that the court of appeals determined that it did not need to address.
756 N.E.2d at 20 n.3.
172 See Malpractice Issues, supra note 16, at 592. The question whether the failure to advise a
client to establish a trust in a no-income tax jurisdiction constitutes malpractice is discussed in
Michael J. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments and Economic
Development: The Tort of “Negligent Trust Situs” at Its Incipient Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662,
671-79 (1998-1999).
173 Malpractice Issues, supra note 16, at 586.
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concerns.174 The gist of the critics’ argument is, of course, dependent
on their position that the UTC dramatically decreases the asset
protection attributes of trusts, a position without substantial support.
For this reason, in my view the critics’ concerns about the malpractice
question are misplaced.
H.

Argument 8: The UTC is a “Regressive” Statute

The most persistent of the critics, Mark Merric, has argued that the
UTC is a “regressive” statute;175 he compares the UTC with the trust
laws of Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah, which, he
claims, are “considered by most estate planning professionals to be
progressive trust statutes.”176
Thus, the apparent meaning of
“regressive” is “unlike the laws in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode
Island, and Utah.” The common characteristic of the trust laws in those
jurisdictions is that they expressly authorize the establishment of socalled asset protection trusts—irrevocable trusts in which the settlor
retains a beneficial interest, designed specifically to shelter the assets of
the settlor from the claims of his or her creditors.177 As discussed
earlier, the UTC follows the traditional approach by providing that a
creditor of the settlor of an irrevocable trust can reach the maximum
amount that can be distributed to the creditor.178 Although he has not
stated so expressly, Mr. Merric’s characterization of the UTC as
regressive, and his reference to statutes authorizing asset protection
trusts as progressive, suggest that a principal motive behind his criticism
of the UTC may be his desire to see more widespread adoption of asset
protection trust legislation.179
Reasonable people can differ as to the advisability of asset
protection trust legislation. The UTC takes the traditional approach by
rejecting asset protection trusts as a matter of public policy. Each
174 The critics make a subsidiary claim that adopting the UTC will lead to a loss of work for
trusts and estates lawyers and professional fiduciaries, as trust business migrates to other, nonUTC jurisdictions. Note that this is an argument that can be used anytime someone opposes
legislation that may make other states’ law more “favorable” for any purpose—the gist of the
argument is that, once the legislation has been enacted, lawyers will be subject to malpractice
liability anytime they fail to send work to lawyers in other states.
175 Arizona’s Nightmare, supra note 2, at 13.
176 Id. (emphasis added).
177 See Richard W. Nenno, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust Comes of Age, 38
HECKERLING INST. EST. PLAN. ¶¶ 202-06 (2004) (discussing the statutes in all five jurisdictions).
178 See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
179 As described on the web site for his law firm, the use of asset protection trusts is apparently
a significant focus of Mr. Merric’s practice. See Merric Law Firm, LLC, Asset Protection
Planning, http://www.internationalcounselor.com/ Serv-assetprotection.htm.
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jurisdiction is free to make its own determination on this public policy
question and can reject the UTC approach if it views asset protection
trusts favorably. Moreover, enacting the UTC is not altogether
inconsistent with asset protection trusts—the statute can be modified, as
was done in Utah, expressly to permit them.180 Thus, while it is true
that the UTC follows the traditional approach in this regard, having
done so should not be considered a deficiency in the statute.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CODE
This Part of the Article offers a normative analysis of particular
elements of Article Five (and the closely related language of section
814), and concludes with some modest suggestions for reform.
A.

Abolishing the Distinction Between Support and
Discretionary Trusts

As earlier discussed, with respect to the claims of creditors the
UTC draws no distinction between so-called support trusts and
discretionary trusts.181 This is accomplished (i) in section 504(b) by
providing that, in general, a creditor may not compel a distribution that
is subject to the trustee’s discretion, regardless of whether the discretion
is subject to a standard, and (ii) in section 504(c) by providing that, for
certain types of creditors’ claims, the creditor may compel distributions
that are subject to the trustee’s discretion, regardless of whether the
discretion is subject to a standard.182 The comment to section 504
makes clear that the distinction between the two types of trusts is
abolished for creditors’ rights purposes, but not for purposes of
determining the rights of the beneficiaries. Moreover, section 506(a)
180 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-505(1)(b) (2005) (creating an exception to UTC § 505(a)(2)
for certain self-settled irrevocable trusts, as authorized by section 25-6-14 of the Utah Code).
181 See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
182 The lack of this distinction in the UTC may also be reflected in section 501, under which,
in the absence of a spendthrift provision, a creditor (including, arguably, a creditor without a
support-related claim) may be able to reach the interest of a beneficiary (including, arguably, an
interest for the beneficiary’s support). This could not have occurred under the Restatement
(Second). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959). On the other hand, section
501 also provides that “[t]he court may limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under the
circumstances,” suggesting that a court might not allow a non-support creditor to recover from a
trust for the beneficiary’s support. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2005). Whether a court would be
likely to allow the claim would presumably depend, in part, on the nature of the non-support
claim and on whether the assets of the trust were more than adequate to provide for the
beneficiary’s support needs.
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and the accompanying comment make clear that an interest in a trust
subject to a standard will be considered discretionary, not mandatory,
for purposes of determining the rights of creditors.183
The conceptual foundation for the common law distinction
between support and discretionary trusts depends on the notion that a
beneficiary with an interest in a trust from which trust distributions were
to be used for specific purposes should not be allowed to transfer his or
her interest—to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes for which
the trust was created.184 Similarly, allowing a creditor (other than one
who had furnished so-called necessaries) to reach the beneficiary’s
interest would be inconsistent with the settlor’s intent. Thus, the rule
developed that a support trust and a spendthrift trust were treated
similarly for purposes of creditors’ rights.185
Implicit in this conceptual framework is that the trustee of a
support trust has little or no discretion in making distributions. The
prototype of such a trust would, for example, provide that the trustee
“shall distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary as much of the
income and principal of the trust as shall be necessary for the
beneficiary’s support and health.” Note how this prototypical language
creates both a floor limiting the trustee’s ability to withhold
distributions and a ceiling limiting the trustee’s ability to make
distributions. In theory, the trustee is not exercising discretion at all, but
simply fulfilling the administrative task of implementing the dispositive
provisions of the trust.186
In practice, however, few, if any, beneficial interests subject to a
standard are not also subject to the trustee’s discretion. Even with
respect to the apparently discretion-free language in the example above,
the trustee arguably must exercise his judgment concerning the meaning
of “support” and “health,” the amounts necessary to satisfy the
beneficiary’s support and health care needs, the appropriate timing of
distributions, whether distributions should be made directly to the
beneficiary or instead directly to his support and health care providers,
etc. Moreover, as a practical matter, in most cases of beneficial
interests subject to a standard, the trustee is expressly granted
discretion. Thus, the preceding example might have provided that the
183
184
185

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 506(a).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 cmts. b, c.
See id. (providing generally that a creditor cannot reach a beneficiary’s interest in a support
trust or a spendthrift trust); see also id. § 157 (providing that certain classes of creditors can reach
a beneficiary’s interest in a support trust or a spendthrift trust).
186 Similarly, a general power of appointment that is subject to an ascertainable standard
relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the power holder is treated as nontaxable for purposes of the federal estate and gift taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(A), 2514(c)(1)
(2000).
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trustee “may distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary as much
income and principal of the trust as the trustee shall deem necessary for
the beneficiary’s support and health.” In this example, the granting of
discretion to the trustee is explicit, not implicit.
Should a court scrutinize the actions of the trustees in these two
examples differently? Possibly yes, but articulating how that scrutiny
should differ is challenging. This difficulty, and the apparent
arbitrariness of drawing bright-line distinctions between support trusts
and discretionary trusts, led the drafters of the Restatement (Third) (and,
later, the drafters of the UTC) to abolish the distinction for some
purposes.187
For several reasons, abolishing this distinction in the context of
creditors’ claims is a sensible statutory approach. First, as the foregoing
discussion demonstrates, determining the nature of a beneficiary’s
interest is a more subtle exercise than the arbitrary distinction between
support trusts and discretionary trusts might suggest. Second, with
respect to limiting creditors’ claims under section 503(b), a distinction
between the two types of trusts is probably unnecessary, the UTC
having abolished the preferred status of suppliers of necessaries.188
Third, with respect to claims by the preferred creditors identified in
section 503(c), there seems to be little reason to distinguish between the
two types of trusts. If anything, allowing such a creditor to reach the
assets of a support trust but not the assets of a wholly discretionary trust
may actually do greater violence to the intent of the settlor; depending
on the precise terms of the trust, a settlor creating a trust for the
beneficiary’s support may be more concerned about preserving assets
187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. a (2003). As explained in the Reporter’s
Notes to comment a:
Not only is the supposed distinction between support and discretionary trusts arbitrary
and artificial, but the lines are also difficult—and costly—to attempt to draw.
Attempting to do so tends to produce dubious categorizations and almost inevitably
different results (based on fortuitous differences in wording or maybe a “fireside”
sense of equity) from case to case for beneficiaries who appear, realistically, to be
similarly situated as objects of similar settlor intentions. . . .
....
The fact of the matter is that there is a continuum of discretionary trusts, with the
terms of distributive powers ranging from the most objective (or “ascertainable,” IRC §
2041) of standards (pure “support”) to the most open ended (e.g., “happiness”) or
vague (“benefit”) of standards, or even with no standards manifested at all (for which a
court will probably apply “a general standard of reasonableness”).
Id. (emphasis added).
188 The point is that, under the common law, as exemplified by the Restatement (Second), in
general a creditor could reach the beneficiary’s interest in neither a support trust or a discretionary
trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154, 155(1) (1959). A supplier of necessaries,
however, could reach a beneficiary’s interest in a support trust. Id. § 157(b), (c). Abolishing the
preferred status of supplier of necessaries thus partially obviates the need for a distinction
between the two types of trusts under the UTC.
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for the beneficiary (and thus sheltering those assets from creditors
claims) than a settlor who creates a trust that is wholly discretionary.
B.

The Good Faith Standard of Section 814(a)

As discussed in Part III.D, the UTC critics claim that the good faith
standard of section 814(a) subjects a trustee holding extended
discretionary powers to a higher level of scrutiny than at common law.
Part III.D refutes this claim, but it engages in no normative analysis of
the good faith rule. This Part of the Article considers the good faith rule
as a normative matter.189 It also examines the apparent requirement
under the Restatement (Third) that a trustee act “reasonably.”
Section 814(a) of the UTC provides that
[n]otwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the
terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as “absolute”,
“sole”, or “uncontrolled”, the trustee shall exercise a discretionary
power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes
of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.190

Section 814(a) is a mandatory rule, meaning that it cannot be
varied by the terms of the trust.191 The UTC further provides in section
1008, also a mandatory rule,192 that
[a] term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is
unenforceable to the extent that it . . . relieves the trustee of liability
for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the
beneficiaries.193

189 Note that this issue—the degree of scrutiny of trustees making discretionary distributions—
is of limited relevance as far as creditors’ rights are concerned. This is because, under section
504(b), most creditors have no ability to compel discretionary distributions; in other words, they
do not stand in the beneficiary’s shoes in this respect. The issue is relevant, however, under
section 504(c), because a creditor child or spouse does have the ability to compel discretionary
distributions under limited circumstances. The issue is also arguably relevant to (i) whether the
trust interest is a countable resource for purpose of needs-based government benefits and (ii)
whether the trust interest may affect the economic circumstances of the beneficiary for purposes
of alimony and child support awards.
190 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a) (2005).
191 See id. § 105(b)(2) (providing that “[t]he terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this
[Code] except . . . the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”) (second alteration in original). Note
that section 105(b)(1) was amended in 2005 to make its language consistent with the language of
section 814(a). See id. § 105 cmt. (discussing 2005 amendment, and noting that no substantive
change was intended).
192 See id. § 105(b)(10) (providing that “[t]he terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this
[Code] except . . . the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 1008”).
193 Id. § 1008(a)(1).
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Thus, under the UTC, it is impossible to create a trust in which the
trustee is not required to act in good faith.
Should a trustee be required to act in good faith? Stated another
way, should the law permit a settlor to relieve a trustee from the
obligation to act in good faith? The answer to the second question
depends on whether the settlor intends to create a trust, or whether the
settlor instead intends to create some other type of property
management arrangement, for example, a power of appointment, as
discussed below. But the essential attribute of a trust is the
establishment of a fiduciary relationship, and a fiduciary relationship
cannot exist if the person controlling investment and distribution
decisions has no enforceable duties toward others.194 Moreover, an
essential attribute of being a fiduciary is that you must place your
personal financial interests secondary to the interests of the beneficiaries
and that you must be impartial in your dealing with beneficiaries.
Relieving a fiduciary of the obligation to act in good faith would thus be
anathema to being a fiduciary; it would, in effect, mean that the trust
would be unenforceable, an illusory arrangement in which the trustee
would be beholden to no one. Thus, the answer to the first question
must be “yes.” One can think of little associated with being a fiduciary
that is more important than the notion that the fiduciary must act
honestly and with motives that are consistent with the purposes of the
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.
As explained by Professor Langbein, the good faith requirement
“serves a truth-in-labeling policy”:
A settlor who wishes to benefit T, the trustee, may do so. For
example, the settlor may grant T, the trustee, a general power of
appointment, which would allow T to appoint some or all of the trust
property to T personally, but the settlor must identify the interest in
that way. The settlor may not get that result by dispensing with good
faith administration of the trust, thereby allowing the trustee to loot
the trust. This insistence on correct labeling, in addition to
promoting efficient judicial administration, serves protective and
cautionary functions. The suspicion is ever present that a term
dispensing with good faith trust administration may not have been
properly disclosed to the settlor, or that the settlor may not have
under its effect. . . . The mandatory rule against bad faith trusteeship
can be understood to operate as a presumption that trust terms
authorizing bad faith must have been improperly concealed from the
settlor or otherwise misunderstood by the settlor when propounded,

194 This does not mean, of course, that the trustee cannot also be a beneficiary, but the sole
trustee cannot be the sole beneficiary—the nature of a trust requires that the trustee owe a duty to
someone other than himself or herself.
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because no settlor seeking to benefit the beneficiary would expose
the beneficiary to the hazards of bad trusteeship.195

Professor Langbein’s example compares a trust with a general
power of appointment, under which the power-holder can benefit
himself or herself. But a similar comparison can be made between a
trust and a non-general power of appointment, under which the powerholder can appoint to a class of persons that does not include himself or
herself. If the settlor wishes to relieve T from the obligation to
distribute property among others in good faith, the settlor may do so by
creating a non-general power of appointment.196 In other words, the
requirement that a trustee act in good faith is directed not just against
looting by the trustee, but also against the trustee failing to act
impartially. Bearing in mind the distinction between a trustee and the
donee of a power of appointment, it is clear that the UTC does not
require all parties to a trust to act in good faith; rather, it imposes this
requirement only on trustees.
As Professor Newman observes, an examination of cases from
areas other than trust law reveals that the obligation to act in good faith
is inextricably associated with being a fiduciary.197 Moreover, even
outside the fiduciary context, the law frequently imposes an obligation
to act in good faith. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code
establishes an obligation to act in good faith, even in the context of
arms’ length business transactions.198 To suggest that a fiduciary should
be held to a lower standard than parties who contract with one another
seems patently absurd.
A further question is whether a trustee granted extended discretion
is or should be subject to a reasonableness requirement. The origin of
this issue lies apparently in the Restatement (Second), which suggests
that under certain circumstances the conduct of a trustee should be
evaluated by a subjective (rather than an objective) standard. For
example, comment i to section 187199 states that:
195 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1124
(2004).
196 A power of appointment is not a fiduciary power and thus may be exercised arbitrarily, as
long as it is exercised consistent with its terms. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt.
a (2003). Thus, for example, if a settlor wishes for a person to have the power to distribute
income among a group of beneficiaries with no obligation to allocate distributions among the
recipients in good faith, the settlor can grant the person a non-general power.
197 See Newman, supra note 123, at 617-18 n.254 (citing cases involving insurers and
insureds; personal representatives and beneficiaries of an estate; physicians and patients;
principals and agents; etc.).
198 Id.
199 Section 187 provides that “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to
the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an
abuse by the trustee of his discretion.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
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The nature of the power conferred upon the trustee . . . may be such
that there is no standard indicated by the terms of the trust by which
the reasonableness of his conduct in exercising or failing to exercise
the power can be judged. In such a case, however, the court will
interpose if the trustee acts dishonestly, or from some improper
motive. Thus, if power is conferred upon the trustee to appoint
income or principal in favor of a particular beneficiary if he so
chooses, without any reference to the needs of the beneficiary, the
court will not interpose if the trustee acts honestly and from proper
motives.200

Note that this passage suggests that the trustee will not be in breach
of his duties as long as he subjectively believes his conduct to be
appropriate, even if the conduct may not be reasonable under an
objective standard. Comment j to section 187 further provides:
The extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee depends
primarily upon the manifestation of intention of the settlor. The
language of the settlor is construed so as to effectuate the purposes of
the trust. The mere fact that the trustee is given discretion does not
authorize him to act beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.
The settlor may, however, manifest an intention that the trustee’s
judgment need not be exercised reasonably, even where there is a
standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee’s conduct can be
judged. This may be indicated by a provision in the trust instrument
that the trustee shall have “absolute” or “unlimited” or
“uncontrolled” discretion. These words are not interpreted literally
but are ordinarily construed as merely dispensing with the standard
of reasonableness. In such a case the mere fact that the trustee has
acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient
ground for interposition by the court, so long as the trustee acts in a
state of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that he
would act. But the court will interfere if the trustee acts in a state of
mind not contemplated by the settlor. Thus the trustee will not be
permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust . . . .201

Note, again, that according to the Restatement (Second), in the
case of extended discretion, a trustee will not be considered in breach of
his or her duties as long as he or she acts with a particular state of mind.
This is a subjective, not an objective, test.
Interestingly, as noted by numerous other observers, there seems to
be little case law support for the Restatement (Second) position. For
example, according to Professor Bogert, “[t]he authorites do not appear
to support the Restatement [Second] position that there is no
requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of a power granted in the
200
201

Id. § 187 cmt. i (emphasis added).
Id. § 187 cmt. j (emphasis added).
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To the contrary, Professor Bogert

[i]n addition to the commonly recognized factors used to determine
whether there had been an abuse of discretion, a standard of
reasonableness has been applied by the courts in judging the exercise
of a discretionary power (whether simple or absolute), a standard
implied from the settlor’s intent and the purposes expressed in the
trust instrument. With respect to court review of discretionary
powers, this standard is consistent with the standard of care and skill
of a prudent man and is based upon established fiduciary standards
and principles.203

Similarly, the Restatement (Third) observes that there are few, if
any cases, in which extended discretionary language has been construed
to excuse unreasonable conduct.204 Professors Dukeminier, Johanson,
Lindgren, and Sitkoff are similarly skeptical that the case law supports
the Restatement (Second)’s position.205
As discussed earlier, the UTC properly requires a trustee to act in
good faith, even in cases of extended discretion. It would similarly be
inconsistent with the concept of a fiduciary to excuse unreasonable
conduct by a trustee. A purely subjective standard for measuring trustee
conduct is insufficient, because it could excuse highly questionable
actions by a trustee as long as the trustee subjectively believed his or her
actions to be appropriate. Consider, for example, a trust under which
the trustee is authorized to “distribute income and principal in such
amounts and for such purposes as the trustee deems appropriate in the
trustee’s sole and absolute discretion”—in other words, a wholly
discretionary trust with language granting the trustee extended
discretion. Suppose the beneficiary, through no fault of his own, is
destitute, but the trustee nevertheless refuses to pay for an objectively
necessary medical procedure, believing in good faith that the
beneficiary will recover from his condition without medical
intervention. In the absence of a standard of reasonableness, the
trustee’s refusal to make a distribution may not be subject to review.206
202
203
204
205

BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 127, § 560, at 217-18.
Id. § 560.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 reporter’s note on cmt. c (2003).
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 540-41 (7th ed. 2005)
(concluding that “the difference between simple discretion and ‘absolute’ discretion is one of
degree and that the trustee’s action must not only be in good faith but also to some extent
reasonable, with more elasticity in the concept of reasonableness the greater the discretion
given”).
206 This is an extreme example, but it demonstrates that a subjective standard of good faith
would not necessarily protect against all undesirable conduct by a trustee. Presumably, virtually
all courts would intercede on behalf of the beneficiary under these facts; some courts would hold
that the trustee failed to act reasonably, others that the trustee had failed to act in good faith. But
note that a court holding that the trustee failed to act in good faith under these facts, in effect,
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Moreover, a purely subjective standard would impose an undue burden
of proof on beneficiaries seeking to challenge a trustee’s actions—in
most cases, only the trustee would know whether he or she was acting
in good faith, and evidence to the contrary would be difficult or
impossible to produce.
C.

The Power to Compel Distributions Under Section 504(c)

Section 503(b)(1) of the UTC exempts certain claims of children,
spouses, and former spouses from the effects of a spendthrift provision.
The effect of the section 503(b)(1) exemption is to permit the claimant
to attach trust distributions that otherwise would be made to the
beneficiary;207 the provision does not authorize the claimant to compel a
distribution from the trust. Thus, the exemption entitles the claimant to
receive mandatory distributions,208 as well as distributions that the
trustee decides to make in its discretion. In the case of a wholly
discretionary trust, a trustee in its discretion could determine to
withhold all distributions, in which case the section 503(b)(3)
exemption would provide the claimant with no access to the
beneficiary’s interest.
As discussed earlier, section 504(c) of the UTC provides that a
court may order a trustee to make a distribution from a trust for
purposes of satisfying certain claims of children, spouses, and former
spouses, but only to the extent that the trustee is determined to have
failed to comply with a standard or has abused a discretion. Section
504(c) thus fills in a gap left by section 503(b)(1)—it permits those
claimants to compel distributions under limited circumstances, thus
preventing a trustee under those circumstances from withholding
distributions for the purpose of defeating their claims.
One of the critics’ principal objections to the UTC is that section
504(c) expands the rights of these categories of creditors beyond the
rights held by them at common law.209 In some respects they are
correct, in the sense that a child, spouse, or former spouse under certain
circumstances could theoretically compel distributions from a wholly
discretionary trust (as opposed to a trust with a support standard),210
would be imposing an objective standard on the conduct of the trustee, the subjective intentions
of the trustee being insufficient to protect the trustee from liability. Thus, even courts claiming
not to impose a standard of reasonableness may in fact often be doing so.
207 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2005).
208 This is subject, of course, to the court’s authority to limit the claimant’s award, after taking
into account the financial circumstances of the beneficiary. See id. § 503 (c) & cmt.
209 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.

2604

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

which generally would not be possible at common law. On the other
hand, the claimant’s power under section 504(c) is quite limited—to
prove abuse of discretion in many cases would be either a difficult or an
insurmountable task.211
Putting aside the question whether children, spouses, and former
spouses with support claims merit special treatment for creditors’ rights
purposes,212 having decided to exempt these creditors from the effects
of a spendthrift provision under section 503(b)(1), did the drafters of the
UTC take the right approach in granting these creditors the power to
compel distributions under certain circumstances under section 504(c)?
In one sense, if creditors with these types of claims merit special
treatment, then section 504(c) is appropriate; otherwise, the benefits
conferred upon them by section 503(b)(1) could largely be negated
through careful drafting—limiting the beneficiary’s interest to the
discretion of the trustee would significantly reduce the likelihood that
one of these claimants would ever receive a distribution. In this sense,
section 504(c) is necessary in order to give the protections of section
503(b)(1) any teeth. Section 504(c) is also consistent with the notion—
largely rejected by section 504—that a creditor to whom a spendthrift
provision does not apply should stand in the shoes of the beneficiary.
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the powers held by a claimant under
section 504(c) are limited, and in many cases the provision would do
little to increase the likelihood of a claimant receiving a distribution.
Is section 504(c) in any respect objectionable, putting aside again
the question whether these categories of claimants are worthy of greater
protection? In my view, the answer is “no.” The principal normative
objection to section 504(c) would seem to be that it is inconsistent with
the typical settlor’s intent. However, if a legislature determines that
these categories of creditors’ claims should be exempt from spendthrift
protection, it has implicitly decided that the settlor’s intent must give
211 Nevertheless, section 504(c) does provide an element of protection to children, spouses,
and former spouses. Although it may be difficult for one of these claimants to compel
distributions in most cases, the claimants are nonetheless exempt from any spendthrift limitations
and thus are entitled to receive distributions that the trustee otherwise chooses to make, subject to
the court’s power to limit their awards. Considering the nature of their claims, it seems unlikely
that a court would be willing to allow a beneficiary to receive substantial distributions without
also allowing the claimant to receive distributions. To avoid the claims altogether, the trustee
might be forced to withhold distributions altogether, but this would increase the possibility that
there would be an abuse of discretion or failure to satisfy a standard for purposes of section
504(c). In sum, sections 503 and 504, read together, probably do expand the rights of these
claimants as a practical matter. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 503, 504(c).
212 Notably, a number of jurisdictions have limited the special rules of sections 503(b)(1) and
504(c) to children only, relegating spouses and former spouses to the status of ordinary creditors.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-545.03.B, 55-545.04.C (2005). This is a principled modification
of the statute, for the obvious reason that a spouse or former spouse is on more equal footing with
the beneficiary than is a child.
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way to public policy. Granting those creditors limited rights to compel
discretionary distributions is no less consistent with the settlor’s intent,
and is consistent with the general public policy determination that
certain categories of claimants should have protected status.
D.

Some Modest Suggestions for Reform

This section of the Article offers some modest suggestions for
improvements to Article Five and section 814(a).
1.

Clarifying or Modifying the Relationship Between
Sections 501 and 503

Section 501 of the UTC describes the rights of a beneficiary’s
creditors if the beneficiary’s interest is not subject to a valid spendthrift
provision. Under section 501, if a beneficiary’s interest in a trust is not
subject to a spendthrift provision, “the court may authorize a
creditor . . . of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s interest by
attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary or other means.”213 Compare section 501 with section
503(b), which describes the rights of an exception creditor: such a
claimant “may obtain from a court an order attaching present or future
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”214 The key
difference between the two provisions is that section 501 allows a court
to authorize a creditor to reach the beneficiary’s interest not just by
attachment of present or future distributions, but also by other means.
In the original version of the UTC passed by NCCUSL in 2001, the
comment to section 501 offered the following explanation:
A creditor typically will pursue a claim by serving an order on the
trustee attaching the beneficiary’s interest. Assuming that the
validity of the order cannot be contested, the trustee will then pay to
the creditor instead of to the beneficiary any payments the trustee
would otherwise be required to make to the beneficiary, as well as
discretionary distributions the trustee decides to make. The creditor
may also, in theory, force a judicial sale of a beneficiary’s
interest.215

The quoted language was omitted from the comment in connection
with amendments to section 501 in 2005. The comment now provides
213
214
215

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501.
Id. § 503(b).
Id. § 501 cmt. (2001) (emphasis added).
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simply that “[t]his section does not prescribe the procedures (“other
means”) for reaching a beneficiary’s interest . . . , leaving [that] issue[]
to the enacting State’s laws on creditor rights.”216 In explaining the
2005 changes, the comment further states that “[c]larifying changes
are . . . made in the comments and unnecessary language on creditor
remedies are omitted.”217 Thus, the drafters apparently believed that the
earlier comment about a possible judicial sale of a beneficiary’s interest
was unnecessary, because local law (outside the UTC) either would or
would not provide such a remedy. Nevertheless, the drafters clearly
contemplated that such a remedy might be available under appropriate
circumstances for actions brought by creditors under section 501. The
comment to section 503 offers no additional explanation for the
differences between the two provisions, but it is apparent that the
drafters contemplated that judicial sales would not be available under
section 503. The comment to section 503 mentions no remedies other
than attachment of present or future distributions. Moreover, an earlier
version of the comment stated that section 503 “does not authorize the
spousal or child claimant to force a sale of the beneficiary’s interest.”218
This distinction between the approaches of sections 501 and 503(b) is
consistent with the Restatement (Third).219
The distinction between sections 501 and 503 should have little
practical significance in most cases, because only rarely will a trust fail
to include a spendthrift provision protecting each of the beneficial
interests. Nevertheless, if the drafters intend for the remedies under the
two provisions to differ, which appears to be the case, it would be
helpful to make this point explicit in the comments to both provisions.
As to whether the distinction is appropriate, this is a question on
which reasonable people can differ. In one respect, the distinction
makes little sense—if, as a matter of policy, a state determines that a
spendthrift provision should be ineffective with respect to certain types
of claims, then it would seem appropriate to grant exception creditors
the full panoply of remedies available to creditors in the case of nonspendthrift trusts. Under this approach, a spendthrift provision would
either be effective or not—thus, for example, the claim of a child with a
support order could be satisfied in the same manner, regardless of
whether the trust includes a spendthrift provision. This approach would
216
217
218

Id. § 501 cmt. (2005).
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. b (2003) (citing an earlier version of the
comment to section 503(b)).
219 See id. § 56 cmt. e (providing, in the case of trust with no spendthrift provision, that the
court may order a judicial sale of the beneficiary’s interest); § 59 cmt. b (providing that, at least in
the case of claims by children, spouses, and former spouses for support, an exception creditor
cannot force a sale of the beneficiary’s interest).
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also simplify the UTC, because the remedies prescribed in section 503
would be superfluous.
On the other hand, the distinction between sections 501 and 503(b)
may simply reflect a reasonable political compromise, between those
who would prefer that spendthrift protection be absolute and those who
would prefer that it be completely ineffective with respect to certain
categories of claimants. In effect, the UTC provides that, with respect
to certain categories of claimants, there is quasi-spendthrift protection,
under which the claimant can attach present or future distributions, but
cannot force a judicial sale of the beneficiary’s interest. Because that
appears to be the intended effects of sections 501 and 503, the point
should be made explicit.
2.

Clarifying or Modifying the Comment to Section 814(a)

As discussed earlier, section 814(a) imposes on trustees a nonwaivable duty to act in good faith, which, as argued earlier, is consistent
with a trustee’s duties at common law. Section 814(a) does not itself
address the question of whether a trustee is also required to act
reasonably, although the issue is addressed in the comment, as amended
in 2005:
Subsection (a) requires a trustee to exercise a discretionary power in
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust
and the interests of the beneficiaries. Similar to Restatement
(Second) of Trusts Section 187 (1959), subsection (a) does not
impose an obligation that a trustee’s decision be within the bounds of
a reasonable judgment, although such an interpretive standard may
be imposed by the courts if the document adds a standard whereby
the reasonableness of the trustee’s judgment can be tested.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 cmt. f (1959).220

As observed earlier, the comment refers to the distinction in the
Restatement (Second) between discretion subject to a standard and
discretion in the absence of a standard,221 but it does not refer to the
Restatement (Second)’s distinction between ordinary discretion and
extended discretion,222 the drafters apparently intending to leave this
question to the common law.

220
221

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814 cmt.
See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. According to the Restatement (Second),
a reasonableness requirement is imposed only if there is a standard against which it can be
measured.
222 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. According to the Restatement (Second), the
use of extended discretion dispenses with the reasonableness requirement.
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The apparent purpose of the 2005 change in the comment was to
refute the argument of some critics that the good faith standard of
section 814(a) means that a trustee must also always act reasonably. In
my view, for at least two reasons, the 2005 change was ill advised.
First, assuming that it is appropriate to relieve trustees from a standard
of reasonable conduct, the comment should make clear whether the
drafters intend that to be true, as in the Restatement (Second), if the
instrument grants the trustee extended discretion. Second, and more
fundamentally, in my view it is inappropriate to suggest that, under
some circumstances, a trustee may be relieved from a standard of
reasonableness. As observed,223 the Restatement (Second) approach to
this question seems to have little support at common law and is
inconsistent with the concept of a fiduciary.
CONCLUSION
This Article is, ultimately, a defense of Article Five: though
imperfect, Article Five does not do what the critics claim. It does not
undermine spendthrift protections; in fact, in many respects, it actually
strengthens them. Moreover, contrary to the critics’ claims, Article Five
does not constitute a significant departure from the common law.
Where it does so depart (or with respect to questions for which the
common law fails to provide a clear rule), Article Five strikes an
appropriate balance between the interests of settlors and their
beneficiaries and the interests of creditors. At best, the critics’ claims
about Article Five are misinformed or misguided; at worst, they are
deceptive. Most importantly, the arguments of the critics should not be
permitted to impede further adoptions of the UTC.

223

See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.

